Exclusion Costs and the In‐Kind Transfer

Toumanoff, Peter

doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1986.tb00780.x

Cited by 4 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 6 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…At higher second-hand prices, the advantage of the durable nature of the good provides an income equivalent (again at initial prices) between One' and Oy/&dquo;. The lower the second-hand price, the more likely that Toumanoff's (1986) &dquo;sorting mechanism&dquo; (between eligible and ineligible) will operate even for durable consumption goods. When the second-hand price is as shown by the slope of line 5-6, the high income will sell Ox.…”

Section: A Durable Consumption Goodmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…How can transferability of demand to the ineligible be avoided? Toumanoff's (1986) answer is to consider in-kind transfer goods as inferior goods, so that higher-income ineligible individuals have less incentive to present themselves as eligible. For the high-income individual, that results in a comer solution at H (where the income consumption curve [ICC] &dquo;hits&dquo; the y-axis), and a complete separating equilibrium would be achieved.…”

Section: In-kind Transfers Of a Nondurable Consumption Goodmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Although not cast formally in this context, Toumanoff's (1986) short article explores conditions for preventing arbitrage (Tirole 1988). The type of arbitrage associated with transferability of the commodity is inherently circumscribed for the provision of nondurable consumption goods (a hot meal and a bed for the night).…”

Section: In-kind Transfers Of a Nondurable Consumption Goodmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 In this article, Toumanoff's (1986) analysis is recast in a form that permits a comparison between durable and nondurable consumption goods. The distinction is important in an analysis of the limits of Toumanoff's argument.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

In-Kind Versus Cash Transfert: Assessing Disbursement

Jones

Cullis

1997

Public Finance Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

One advantage of in-kind transfers is that they can focus assistance on low-income (eligible) beneficiaries by appearing relatively unattractive to high-income (ineligible) individuals. This article attempts to identify the conditions under which an inkind transfer performs selectively. Central to the analysis is the question of whether an in-kind transfer is disbursed in a way that permits resale. In the United Kingdom, recent "privatization" schemes have transferred durable consumption goods to the private sector. Such schemes permit in-kind assistance to be encashed and create "perverse" income redistribution.Although textbook analysis usually depicts cash transfers as &dquo;superior&dquo; to in-kind transfers,' Toumanoff ( 1986) discusses one case where in-kind transters prove a supenor instrument tor redistribution. His argument is that in-kind subsidies can be offered in a form that would attract only &dquo;eligible&dquo; recipients, thereby avoiding the problem of perverse redistribution. If an inferior good were provided as an in-kind transfer, high-and middle-income individuals would be less inclined to make an ineligible claim on the good (or service). Disbursement of the transfer would be less costly, requiring less monitoring by the government. The general argument also is found in discussing the policy problem of targeting welfare services on eligible recipients. For example, Goodin and Le Grand ( 1987, 206) argue, &dquo;One sure way-perhaps the only way-to guarantee that the nonpoor will not partake of a service is to make it a bad service. If quality is low, or the conditions of use are disagreeable, or there is some stigma AUTHORS' NOTE: The authors wish to acknowledge the very helpful comments of the editor and of an anonymous referee. Should any errors remain, they are, of course, the sole responsibility of the authors.

show abstract

Section: A Durable Consumption Goodmentioning

confidence: 94%

Section: In-kind Transfers Of a Nondurable Consumption Goodmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: In-kind Transfers Of a Nondurable Consumption Goodmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

In-Kind Versus Cash Transfert: Assessing Disbursement

Jones

Cullis

1997

Public Finance Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The second argument follows the same reasoning as the Samaritan's dilemma as presented by Buchanan (1975) and refers to the imperfection of information, especially regarding the amount of information available to the donor. If information on preferences were not publicly available to the donor -which is the Governmentthe superiority of monetary transfers over those in kind would disappear (Diamond, Mirrlees, 1978;Dye, Antle, 1986;Harris, Townsend, 1981;Nichols, Zeckhauser, 1982;Roberts, 1984;Toumanoff, 1986;Blackorby, Donaldson, 1988). Indeed, this could result from the fact that certain individuals would try to claim transfers originally meant for others.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Altruism, Paternalism and Transfers

Ballet¹,

Méral²,

Razafimahatolotra³

2009

Prague Economic Papers

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract:Discussions regarding the form that state transfers should take generally focus on the relative effi ciency of transfers in kind vis-à-vis transfers in cash. This article, however, proposes a different approach -to determine the optimal structure of a donation, i.e. its optimal composition. Hence, the problem no longer lies in attempting to fi gure out whether a donation in kind is either more or less effi cient than a donation in cash, but rather, to determine, through various hypotheses relative to the agent's behaviour, the most preferable structure for the donor.

show abstract

Why Need is “A Word We Cannot Do Without” in Economics

McCain

2012

Forum for Social Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Exclusion Costs and the In‐Kind Transfer

Cited by 4 publications

References 6 publications

In-Kind Versus Cash Transfert: Assessing Disbursement

In-Kind Versus Cash Transfert: Assessing Disbursement

Altruism, Paternalism and Transfers

Why Need is “A Word We Cannot Do Without” in Economics

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About