Examining Legislative Cue‐Taking in the <scp>US</scp> Senate

Ryan, Josh M.; Sokhey, Anand Edward

doi:10.1111/lsq.12064

Cited by 17 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…Consequently, they rely on various sources of information when making voting decisions, but they are especially likely to turn to fellow lawmakers whom they trust and view as knowledgeable (Kingdon ; Matthews and Stimson ; Sullivan et al ). Consequently, empirical work finds the cues lawmakers take from their colleagues influence behavior in both the House (Curry ) and Senate (Box‐Steffensmeier, Ryan, and Sokhey ). There is also evidence congressional leaders take advantage of these dynamics and seek to draw key legislators into the policy‐formation process who can serve as effective cue‐givers later on (Curry and Lee ; Huitt ).…”

Section: Knowledge Expertise and Contemporary Committee Influencementioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge, Expertise, and Committee Power in the Contemporary Congress

Curry

2018

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Scholars, practitioners, and observers typically portray committee influence as rooted in traditional congressional processes and practices, which are thought to provide committees with powerful opportunities to block and shape legislative proposals. The erosion of regular order processes suggests these traditional processes cannot underlie committee power in the contemporary Congress. Drawing on a mixed‐methods approach of interviews with congressional staff and an original data set of every amendment offered on the floor of the House of Representatives from 2005 to 2008, I find that absent these traditional process norms, committees in the contemporary Congress can rely on their specialized knowledge and expertise to influence the behavior of their colleagues and shape the legislation that passes.

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Section: Knowledge Expertise and Contemporary Committee Influencementioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge, Expertise, and Committee Power in the Contemporary Congress

Curry

2018

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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“…3 Even the perception of being skilled and knowledgeable in a certain policy area may benefit new MCs as fellow members defer to their expertise. Members lacking information on policies outside of their own area of specialization often look to other MCs, especially to those who they view as particularly knowledgeable, for information and direction when making legislative decisions (Box-Steffensmeier, Ryan, & Sokhey, 2015;Curry, 2015;Kingdon, 1989;Matthews & Stimson, 1975).…”

Section: The Nexus Of Careers and Committee Assignmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Precongressional Careers and Committees: The Impact of Congruence

Francis

Bramlett

2017

American Politics Research

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We explore the impact that precongressional careers have on the behavior of new members in the U.S. House of Representatives. Does a former doctor act differently in the House than a former state legislator, lawyer, or businesswoman? Is the former doctor more productive as a new member if assigned to a committee that utilizes his or her perceived and actual experiences in the medical field? We posit that new members who are assigned to committees that align with their career experiences are more active legislators and obtain legislative expertise more quickly than other new members of Congress (MCs), with implications for their future political ambition. To explore these claims, we collected an extensive dataset of the precongressional career experiences of first and second term MCs from the 101st-113th Congresses (1989-2014), their committee assignments, legislative activity, and political ambition. We find that MCs with career-committee congruence have a legislative advantage compared with other new MCs, influencing their transition and trajectory in Congress. Many MCs matched with the right committee are more likely to introduce legislation in their policy area. In addition, we provide some evidence that MCs obtain committee leadership positions more often than their peers without the same early advantage.

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“…Specifically, we conceive of vote choice as a cueing dynamic, where one (set of) legislator(s) sends a signal to (an)other (set of) legislator(s) indicating the appropriate vote choice. This signal can be "any communication-verbal or non-verbal-intended or unintended-that is employed by the cue-taker as a prescription for his vote" (Matthews and Stimson 1975, 51; see also Box-Steffensmeier, Ryan, and Sokhey 2015;Kingdon 1973Kingdon , 1977Masket 2008;Ringe 2010;Stimson 1975;Sullivan et al 1993).…”

Section: Measuring Legislative Influencementioning

confidence: 99%

Pinpointing the Powerful: Covoting Network Centrality as a Measure of Political Influence

Ringe

Wilson

2016

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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This article introduces centrality in covoting networks as a measure of influence. Based on a simple cueing dynamic, it conceptualizes those lawmakers as most centraland thus as having the greatest signaling influence-who impact the greatest number of colleagues' voting decisions. A formal proof and an agent-based simulation show that cue-providers are always more central than followers; hence, we can use real-world voting data to identify the most influential legislators. To confirm the measure's construct validity, we predict covoting centrality in the European Parliament and find those factors that are expected to impact legislators' influence to predict their centrality.Political actors are not created equal. Some are more influential than others, be it due to the formal positions of power they hold, positive personal traits like skills, experience, expertise, ambition, and determination, or less positive traits, like a lack of scruples. Yet, measuring political power and influence is exceedingly difficult. In this article, we introduce a new measure of influence that draws from the study of power in social networks: political actors' centrality in covoting networks. Specifically, we use legislators' voting patterns to measure their social connectedness and, on this basis, examine the structural positions of individual lawmakers to determine their relative influence (Bailey and Sinclair 2008). The basis for this conceptualization of voting as a relational activity is a simple cueing dynamic in which some lawmakers (cue-receivers) follow the lead of select colleagues (cue-providers) when voting in a legislature. Those legislators whose cues influence the greatest number of colleagues' voting decisions are most central in the legislative covoting network and thus have the greatest signaling influence. 1 We maintain that cue-providers should always be more central than their followers in covoting networks, which allows us to identify those legislators who are most influential in the sense that their signals affect the votes of the greatest number of colleagues. We make this case, LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, 41, 2,

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Examining Legislative Cue‐Taking in the US Senate

Cited by 17 publications

References 42 publications

Knowledge, Expertise, and Committee Power in the Contemporary Congress

Knowledge, Expertise, and Committee Power in the Contemporary Congress

Precongressional Careers and Committees: The Impact of Congruence

Pinpointing the Powerful: Covoting Network Centrality as a Measure of Political Influence

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