Evolution of extortion in structured populations

Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaž

doi:10.1103/physreve.89.022804

Cited by 154 publications

(110 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…This is independent of T , meaning that at the nearest-neighbor level there exist at least some minimum cooperation level independently of the value of temptation. The existence of a minimum level of cooperation is an interesting result, agreeing with other approaches on innovative dynamics that found similar results using Monte Carlo simulations and experiments with humans [67][68][69]74,79,84,85,99,100].…”

Section: A Master Equationsupporting

confidence: 75%

Role-separating ordering in social dilemmas controlled by topological frustration

et al. 2017

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"Three is a crowd" is an old proverb that applies as much to social interactions as it does to frustrated configurations in statistical physics models. Accordingly, social relations within a triangle deserve special attention. With this motivation, we explore the impact of topological frustration on the evolutionary dynamics of the snowdrift game on a triangular lattice. This topology provides an irreconcilable frustration, which prevents anticoordination of competing strategies that would be needed for an optimal outcome of the game. By using different strategy updating protocols, we observe complex spatial patterns in dependence on payoff values that are reminiscent to a honeycomb-like organization, which helps to minimize the negative consequence of the topological frustration. We relate the emergence of these patterns to the microscopic dynamics of the evolutionary process, both by means of mean-field approximations and Monte Carlo simulations. For comparison, we also consider the same evolutionary dynamics on the square lattice, where of course the topological frustration is absent. However, with the deletion of diagonal links of the triangular lattice, we can gradually bridge the gap to the square lattice. Interestingly, in this case the level of cooperation in the system is a direct indicator of the level of topological frustration, thus providing a method to determine frustration levels in an arbitrary interaction network.

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Section: A Master Equationsupporting

confidence: 75%

Role-separating ordering in social dilemmas controlled by topological frustration

et al. 2017

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“…Now, let us look into the three criteria from a different perspective than in the previous section. First of all, if we wish to enforce a certain relationship between Alice's and Bob's payoffs, as required by the defensibility criterion, we have to consider zero-determinant (ZD) strategies [36,37,38,39,40,41]. In the Appendix, we argue that TFT is indeed the only deterministic case of the generous ZD strategies, which guarantees equal payoffs for both the players.…”

Section: How Tft-atft Stabilizes Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat

Baek

Choi

2017

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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One of the most important questions in game theory concerns how mutual cooperation can be achieved and maintained in a social dilemma. In Axelrod's tournaments of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, Tit-for-Tat (TFT) demonstrated the role of reciprocity in the emergence of cooperation. However, the stability of TFT does not hold in the presence of implementation error, and a TFT population is prone to neutral drift to unconditional cooperation, which eventually invites defectors. We argue that a combination of TFT and anti-TFT (ATFT) overcomes these difficulties in a noisy environment, provided that ATFT is defined as choosing the opposite to the opponent's last move. According to this TFT-ATFT strategy, a player normally uses TFT; turns to ATFT upon recognizing his or her own error; returns to TFT either when mutual cooperation is recovered or when the opponent unilaterally defects twice in a row. The proposed strategy provides simple and deterministic behavioral rules for correcting implementation error in a way that cannot be exploited by the opponent, and suppresses the neutral drift to unconditional cooperation.

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“…If both players are rational and adhere to this, they both end up with a payoff that is lower than the one they would obtained if they had chosen to cooperate. Despite its simplicity, however, the iterated prisoner's dilemma game continues to inspire research across the social and natural sciences [9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27]. If the ranking of the payoffs is changed, other social dilemmas, such as the snowdrift game for T > R > S > P , are obtained, which has also received substantial attention in the recent past [28][29][30][31][32][33][34].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary mixed games in structured populations: Cooperation and the benefits of heterogeneity

et al. 2016

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Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two different games. While in well-mixed populations the random mixture of the two games is always equivalent to the average single game, in structured populations this is not always the case. We show that the outcome is in fact strongly dependent on the distance of separation of the two games in the parameter space. Effectively, this distance introduces payoff heterogeneity, and the average game is returned only if the heterogeneity is small. For higher levels of heterogeneity the distance to the average game grows, which often involves the promotion of cooperation. The presented results support preceding research that highlights the favorable role of heterogeneity regardless of its origin, and they also emphasize the importance of the population structure in amplifying facilitators of cooperation.

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Evolution of extortion in structured populations

Cited by 154 publications

References 46 publications

Role-separating ordering in social dilemmas controlled by topological frustration

Role-separating ordering in social dilemmas controlled by topological frustration

Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat

Evolutionary mixed games in structured populations: Cooperation and the benefits of heterogeneity

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