Evil and the complexity of history: a response to Durston

Trakakis, Nick

doi:10.1017/s0034412503006589

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…If all we know is that (A soc − B soc ) is negative, we are in no position at all to infer the intrinsic moral value (E soc ) of the society at the time it was destroyed or decimated; it may actually have been positive. Nick Trakakis has pointed out that the consequential complexity of history also prevents us from knowing if a primary event that has a positive intrinsic value leads to a gratuitous evil (Trakakis (2003), 451). To clarify, for a single event, its intrinsic moral value (E) may actually be positive but the consequences that unfold from that event, when compared to the best alternative, may result in a negative (A − B).…”

Section: Problem Three: Were Destroyed Societies Evil?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The incompatibility of God and gratuitous evil: implications for the termination of civilizations

Durston¹

2015

Rel. Stud.

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Setting aside the discussion of whether the biblical destruction of the Canaanites actually occurred or was ordered by God, there still remains the philosophical question of whether any good at all justifies an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being in permitting or orchestrating the destruction of an entire society. If we grant that the existence of God is incompatible with gratuitous evil, then God must terminate a society when it reaches a point in its history where the net moral value of permitting it to continue becomes negative. This raises at least four concerns which are discussed here.

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Section: Problem Three: Were Destroyed Societies Evil?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The incompatibility of God and gratuitous evil: implications for the termination of civilizations

Durston¹

2015

Rel. Stud.

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“…Not all philosophers are convinced that the moral judgments made in the arguments for atheism are this complex (e.g. Trakakis 2003, 2006), but given the pro tanto case presented in examples like the foregoing, the burden of proof lies with the critic.…”

Section: The Case For Skeptical Theismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Without a doubt, the most serious and widespread criticism of skeptical theism is that it is somehow at odds with either moral deliberation (Fales 1992; Russell 1996; Almeida and Oppy 2003, 2004; Hasker 2004; Pereboom 2004, 2005; Piper 2007; Maitzen 2009) or moral knowledge (Wachterhauser 1985; Russell 1996; Trakakis 2003; Jordan 2006; Schnall 2007). If we are never in a position to tell whether God has a reason for allowing a particular prima facie evil or not, then we are never in a position to tell whether we should allow a particular prima facie evil or not.…”

Section: 8 Inconsistent With Moral Deliberation/moral Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Skeptical Theism

McBrayer

2010

Philosophy Compass

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Most a posteriori arguments against the existence of God take the following form: If God exists, the world would not be like this (where ‘this’ picks out some feature of the world like the existence of evil, etc.) But the world is like this. Therefore, God does not exist. Skeptical theists are theists who are skeptical of our ability to make judgments of the sort expressed by premise (1). According to skeptical theism, if there were a God, it is likely that he would have reasons for acting that are beyond our ken, and thus we are not justified in making all‐things‐considered judgments about what the world would be like if there were a God. In particular, the fact that we don’t see a good reason for X does not justify the conclusion that there is no good reason for X.1 Thus, skeptical theism purports to undercut most a posteriori arguments against the existence of God. What follows is an account of the nature of skeptical theism, an application of skeptical theism to both the argument from evil and the argument from divine hiddenness, and a review of the cases for and against skeptical theism.

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Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil, or Part of the Problem?

Trakakis

2008

SOPHIA

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Theodicy, the enterprise of searching for greater goods that might plausibly justify God's permission of evil, is often criticized on the grounds that the project has systematically failed to unearth any such goods. But theodicists also face a deeper challenge, one that places under question the very attempt to look for any morally sufficient reasons God might have for creating a world littered with evil. This 'anti-theodical' view argues that theists (and non-theists) ought to reject, primarily for moral reasons, the project of 'justifying the ways of God to men'. Unfortunately, this view has not received the serious attention it deserves, particularly in analytic philosophy of religion. Taking my cues from such antitheodicists as Kenneth Surin, D.Z. Phillips and Dostoyevsky's Ivan Karamazov, I defend several reasons for holding that the way of thinking about God and evil enshrined in theodical discourse can only add to the world's evils, not remove or illuminate them.Keywords Problem of evil . Theodicy . Anti-theodicy . D.Z. Phillips . Dostoevsky No statement, theological or otherwise, should be made that would not be credible in the presence of the burning children. -Rabbi Greenberg (1989: 315) Apart from a few lonely voices in the wilderness -such as those of Kenneth Surin and D.Z. Phillips -there is little discussion today within analytic philosophy of religion of the meta-theodical question of whether it is legitimate (in some significant sense) to offer a theodicy in response to the problem of evil. The recent SOPHIA (2008) 47:161-191

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Evil and the complexity of history: a response to Durston

Cited by 4 publications

References 2 publications

The incompatibility of God and gratuitous evil: implications for the termination of civilizations

The incompatibility of God and gratuitous evil: implications for the termination of civilizations

Skeptical Theism

Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil, or Part of the Problem?

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