Background
Two invasive group A streptococcus (iGAS) infection outbreaks occurred in Montreal in 2016 and 2017; one in a long-term care facility (type
emm
118) and one in the community, primarily involving homeless people (type
emm
74).
Objective
To describe two recent iGAS outbreaks in Montréal and highlight the challenges in dealing with these outbreaks and the need to tailor the public health response to control them.
Methodology
All cases of iGAS were investigated and the isolates were sent to the laboratory for
emm
typing. In both outbreaks, cases of superficial group A
streptococcus
(GAS) infection were identified, through 1) systematic case detection accompanied by screening for asymptomatic carriers among residents and employees of the long-term care facility and 2) sentinel surveillance among homeless people. Visits were made to community organizations providing homeless services (including shelters) and social networks were analyzed to establish whether there were any links among cases of GAS infection (both invasive and noninvasive) and locations frequented. In both outbreaks, recommendations were made to service providers regarding enhancement of infection prevention and control measures.
Results
In the long-term care facility, five cases of type
emm
118 iGAS were identified over a 22-month period, one of which resulted in death. All residents were screened and no carriers were identified. Among the employees, 81 (65%) were screened and fourcarriers were identified. Of those, one was a carrier of type
emm
118 GAS. All carriers were treated, and subsequent follow-up sampling on three carriers (including the one with
emm
118) was negative.
In the community, 23 cases of type
emm
74 iGAS were detected over a 16-month period, four of which resulted in death. Half of the cases (n=12) were described as homeless, and six others were users of services for the homeless. Sentinel surveillance of superficial infections yielded 64 cultures with GAS, chiefly on the skin, including 51 (80%) of type
emm
74. An analysis of the social networks revealed the large number and variety of resources for the homeless used by the cases. Visits to the community organizations providing homeless services revealed the heterogeneity and precariousness of some of these services, the difficulties encountered in applying adequate health and hygiene measures, and the high degree of mobility amongst those who use these services.
Conclusion
The detection and control of iGAS outbreaks in both long-term care establishments and among community organizations providing homeless services are very complex. An outbreak of iGAS can develop in the background over a ...