2020
DOI: 10.1111/meta.12455
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Epistemic Possibility and the Necessity of Origin

Abstract: The necessity of origin suggests that a person's identity is determined by the particular pair of gametes from which the person originated. An implication is that speculative scenarios concerning how we might otherwise have been had our gametic origins been different are dismissed as being metaphysically impossible. Given, however, that many of these speculations are intelligible and commonplace in the discourses of competent speakers, it is overhasty to dismiss them as mistakes. This paper offers a way of und… Show more

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(1 citation statement)
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“…First, Kripke claims that his anti-essentialist opponent refers to the wrong object or person because she 'confuses the epistemological and the metaphysical problems'. The argument that all or some Amo statements express epistemic, not metaphysical, possibilities remains popular among philosophers of science and medicine (Maung 2020), many of whom repeat Kripke's charge that Amo statements rely on 'confusing' epistemic and metaphysical modality (Johnston 2011, p. 183;Korman 2005, p. 654;Walker 2008, p. 353). But Kripke's only motivation for his first charge of confusion is that he imagines his opponent reasoning, fallaciously, that the referent 'could after all have turned out to have [had different material origins], and therefore could have [had different material origins]' (Kripke 1971, p. 20, n. 15, his italics).…”
Section: Kripke On Alternative Material-origin Counterfactualsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, Kripke claims that his anti-essentialist opponent refers to the wrong object or person because she 'confuses the epistemological and the metaphysical problems'. The argument that all or some Amo statements express epistemic, not metaphysical, possibilities remains popular among philosophers of science and medicine (Maung 2020), many of whom repeat Kripke's charge that Amo statements rely on 'confusing' epistemic and metaphysical modality (Johnston 2011, p. 183;Korman 2005, p. 654;Walker 2008, p. 353). But Kripke's only motivation for his first charge of confusion is that he imagines his opponent reasoning, fallaciously, that the referent 'could after all have turned out to have [had different material origins], and therefore could have [had different material origins]' (Kripke 1971, p. 20, n. 15, his italics).…”
Section: Kripke On Alternative Material-origin Counterfactualsmentioning
confidence: 99%