Epistemic entitlement, epistemic risk and leaching

Moretti, Luca; Wright, Crispin

doi:10.1111/phpr.12874

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 19 publications

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“…11 The observant reader will notice that (f) reinterprets Wright's (c) by adverting to warrant rather than knowledge. This slight adjustment, made for expository purposes, is entirely legitimate: in more recent work of his (Moretti and Wright (2022)) it is clear that Wright views the pressure (a) and (b) place on 'S knows p' as indirect, i.e., as stemming from the pressure they directly place on 'S has evidential warrant for p'. 12 Wright (2014).…”

Section: Threats To Epistemic Asymmetries Across Knowable Entailment:...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Entitlement, Leaching, and Counter-Closure

Luzzi¹

2023

Illuminating Errors

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Crispin Wright has articulated and defended the view that by incorporating non-evidential entitlements into our theory of knowledge, we can achieve a satisfactory reply to key sceptical challenges. Crucial to this view is the thesis that various regions of thought are underpinned by 'cornerstone' propositions-propositions for which warrant is antecedently required in order for non-cornerstone or 'ordinary' beliefs in that region to enjoy the epistemic support of experiential evidence. Critics of this view have noted that because cornerstone propositions are entailed by ordinary propositions, a plausible Closure principle delivers two unwelcome results: that one can acquire evidential justification for cornerstones via deduction (alchemy) and that the epistemic risk involved in accepting cornerstone propositions impugns the evidential justification we are supposed to have for ordinary propositions (leaching). Noting that cornerstone propositions are not only potential conclusions of deductive inferences from ordinary propositions, but are primarily intended on Wright's view to perform an enabling role in the inference from evidence to non-cornerstone propositions, I argue that leaching has been misdiagnosed by Wright and his critics as relying essentially on a Closure principle. Instead, it relies on a Counter-Closure-style principle. I argue that once this point is recognised, Wright's own solution to the leaching problem becomes unsatisfactory, and that a guiding maxim from the extant literature for demarcating true from false Counter-Closure-style principles can be usefully applied to identify a successful resolution to the leaching worry on Wright's behalf.

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Section: Threats To Epistemic Asymmetries Across Knowable Entailment:...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Entitlement, Leaching, and Counter-Closure

Luzzi¹

2023

Illuminating Errors

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What hinge epistemology and Bayesian epistemology can learn from each other

Vassend

2023

AJPH

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Hinge epistemology and Bayesianism are two prominent approaches in contemporary epistemology, but the relationship between these approaches has not been systematically studied. This paper formalizes the central commitments of hinge epistemology in a Bayesian framework and argues for the following two theses: (1) many of the types of claims that are treated as paradigmatic hinges in the hinge epistemology literature, such as the claim that there exists an external world of physical objects, are not capable of enabling rational inquiry, even though this is typically regarded as a central property of hinges; (2) the standard Bayesian story of how rational inquiry proceeds is incorrect or at best incomplete.

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Epistemic entitlement, epistemic risk and leaching

Cited by 2 publications

References 19 publications

Entitlement, Leaching, and Counter-Closure

Entitlement, Leaching, and Counter-Closure

What hinge epistemology and Bayesian epistemology can learn from each other

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