Epistemic Entitlement and the Leaching Problem

McGlynn, Aidan

doi:10.1017/epi.2015.63

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…The second main claim of the critical method is that we can gain justification by epistemically transmuting arguments. The obvious concern here is that epistemically relevant features and statuses are always transmitted from whatever we accept in making an argument, to the conclusions of those arguments, which would preclude acquiring justification through arguments that require us to accept things without justification (see, e.g., McGlynn 2017, p. 91: ‘How can we hope to build a stable edifice … on foundations which seem to be less … secure than what they are tasked to support?’) 27…”

Section: The Critical Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Frege's Critical Arguments for Axioms

Hutchinson

2021

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Why does Frege claim that logical axioms are 'self-evident,' to be recognized as true 'independently of other truths,' and then offer arguments for those axioms? I argue that he thinks the arguments provide us with the justification that we need for accepting the axioms and that this is compatible with his remarks about self-evidence. This compatibility depends on philosophical considerations connected with the 'critical method': an interesting approach to the justification of axioms endorsed by leading philosophers at the time.

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Section: The Critical Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Frege's Critical Arguments for Axioms

Hutchinson

2021

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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“…For critical discussion of Wright's response independent of the argument to follow, see(McGlynn, 2017).5 A refinement of this conception, adopted in professional risk management and economics, interprets "risk" as referring to the expectation value of a possible negative event, which is the product of the event's probability and some measure of its severity (cf Hansson, 2018)…”

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confidence: 99%

Epistemic entitlement, epistemic risk and leaching

Moretti

Wright

2022

Philos Phenomenol Research

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One type of argument to sceptical paradox proceeds by making a case that a certain kind of metaphysically “heavyweight” or “cornerstone” proposition is beyond all possible evidence and hence may not be known or justifiably believed. Crispin Wright has argued that we can concede that our rational acceptance of these propositions is evidentially risky though we still remain rationally entitled to those of our ordinary knowledge claims that are seemingly threatened by that concession. A problem for Wright's proposal is the so‐called Leaching Worry: if we are merely rationally entitled to accept the cornerstones without evidence, how can we achieve evidence‐based knowledge of the multitude of quotidian propositions that we think we know, which require the cornerstones to be true? This paper presents a rigorous, novel explication of this worry within a Bayesian framework, and offers the Epistemic Entitlement theorist two distinct responses.

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“…'s conception of entitlements as epistemic rights (see below) is no longer open to this interpretation, as it is primarily meant to account for acquisition of justification rather than claiming justification. SeeMcGlynn (2017).…”

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confidence: 99%

Problems for Wright’s Entitlement Theory

Moretti¹

2021

Non-Evidentialist Epistemology

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Crispin Wright's entitlement theory holds that we have non-evidential justification for accepting propositions of a general type--which Wright calls "cornerstones"--that enables us to acquire justification for believing other propositions--those that we take to be true on the grounds of ordinary evidence. Entitlement theory is meant by Wright to deliver a forceful response to the sceptic who argues that we cannot justify ordinary beliefs. I initially focus on strategic entitlement, which is one of the types of entitlement that Wright has described in more detail. I suggest that it is dubious that we are strategically entitled to accept cornerstones. After this, I focus on entitlement in general. I contend that, in important cases, non-evidential justification for accepting cornerstones cannot secure evidential justification for believing ordinary propositions. My argument rests on a probabilistic regimentation of the so-called "leaching problem".

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Epistemic Entitlement and the Leaching Problem

Cited by 10 publications

References 19 publications

Frege's Critical Arguments for Axioms

Frege's Critical Arguments for Axioms

Epistemic entitlement, epistemic risk and leaching

Problems for Wright’s Entitlement Theory

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