Benevolence, kindness, and empathy are valued virtues among many of the world’s major religions. It is common that people in many cultures see religion as the source of these moral virtues and that one must believe in God to be moral. Despite these widespread assumptions about the associations of religion with morality, some studies raise doubts about the causal connection between them. The main goal of the present study was to test whether religious participants differ from nonreligious ones in terms of how extreme their judgments about moral violations are, how empathic they are, and how disgusting they consider moral violations with disgusting content. It is also our purpose to describe moral judgment processes in an understudied cultural context that has a relevant indigenous characteristic associated with morality. Six hundred fifty-six participants read 6 moral scenarios describing moral violations involving disgusting or nondisgusting contents. They reported their moral reactions using a moral judgment and a moral disgust scale. Measures of empathy, religiosity, religious affiliation, and sociodemographic questions were included in the study. Nonreligious and religious participants had similar levels of empathy and showed similar patterns of moral reactions to different moral violations involving both disgusting and nondisgusting contents. Across 6 moral scenarios, both groups agreed on the most morally wrong and the most disgusting moral violations in similar magnitude. These results question the commonly assumed moral deficit in nonreligious people and support the idea that they can be like religious people when it comes to empathy and judging moral violations.