Emergency signal failure: implications and recommendations

Abstract

As automation becomes more prevalent in complex task systems, operators are confronted with a myriad of emergency signals. Although much research has been performed to improve the structure and function of signalling systems, it has concerned mainly those stimuli that are presumed to accurately indicate danger. The current report discusses the general area of emergency signal failure, its implications for complex task performance, and recommendations for design and research. A general description of the problem is followed by a review of the applicability of scienti® c theory to human behaviour during and following signal failure, and the authors conclude with recommendations for personnel training and warning signal design and research.

Designing acoustic and non-acoustic parameters of synthesized speech warnings to control perceived urgency

“…However, Wheale (1983) argued that synthesized voice warnings produced slower reaction times than other types of auditory warnings. Patterson (1982)'s work and the ensuing research on warning systems (e.g., Bliss et al, 1995;Bliss and Gilson, 1998;Burt et al, 1995;Edworthy et al, 1991;Haas and Casali, 1995;Haas and Edworthy, 1996;Hellier et al, 1993;Momtahan, 1990) has led to an ergonomic approach to modern auditory warning systems. One of the primary issues of concern in this work is the charting of the perceived urgency of non-verbal auditory warnings.…”

The Perceived Urgency of Speech Warnings: Semantics versus Acoustics

“…One ergonomic approach to modern auditory warning design is the guidance provided by Patterson (1982) and the research on warning design that has ensued (e.g., Bliss, Gilson, & Deaton, 1995;Bliss & Gilson, 1998;Burt, Bartolome, Burdette, & Comstock, 1995;Edworthy, Loxley, & Dennis, 1991;Haas & Casali, 1995;Haas & Edworthy, 1996;Hellier, Edworthy, & Dennis, 1993;Momtahan, 1990). One of the primary issues of concern in this work has been the charting of the perceived urgency of auditory warnings.…”

How the cockpit manages anomalies: revisiting the dynamic fault management model for aviation

“…The warning system has more than two thousand fault messages categorized in different levels of risk based on a fault-tree analysis (Heymann et al 2007). Its sensitiveness attempts to balance the risk of triggering alarms all the time, including false alarms (Bliss and Gilson 1998;Bliss et al 1999;Bliss and Dunn 2000), and detecting a situation before it becomes irreversible (Papastavrou and Lehto 1996;Woods 2015). In the event of multiple faults, the system indicates the root cause(s), which is often related to electrical system malfunctions (Carim Jr et al 2016).…”