Eliminating Prudential Reasons

Worsnip, Alex

doi:10.1093/oso/9780198828310.003.0012

Cited by 16 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…I then showed, more concessively, how each is 30 See Hayward (forthcoming) for a recent defence of the most stark dissenting view -that there are no normative requirements of prudence, even the sort of structural requirements people often think of as constitutive of rationality. See also Worsnip (2018 compatible with the existence of prudential reasons for attitudes. I now move on to the second part of the chapter: whether prudential judgements are normative.…”

Section: Objection 2: Humeanism About Reasonsmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…For this reason, and constraints of space, I pass over discussing it. 18 For example, Nagel (1970), Worsnip (2018), Hayward (forthcoming). 19 I take the plausibility of this -that something's being your best option gives you prudential reason to choose it -to undermine Scanlon's (1998) scepticism about the normative importance of well-being.…”

Section: Objection 1: All Reasons Are Agent Neutralmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For detailed discussion of these points seeWorsnip (2018).26 The issues here are structurally similar to those concerning Humeanism and moral reasons. Humeans hold that morality and its demands cannot fundamentally generate reasons, only desires can.…”

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confidence: 96%

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Taking Prudence Seriously

Fletcher¹

2019

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14

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Philosophers have long theorized about which things make people’s lives go well, and why, and the extent to which morality and self-interest can be reconciled. Yet little time has been spent on meta-prudential questions, questions about prudential discourse. This is surprising given that prudence is, prima facie, a normative form of discourse and, as such, cries out for further investigation. Chapter 4 takes up two major meta-prudential questions. It first examines whether there is a set of prudential reasons, generated by evaluative prudential properties, and defends the view that evaluative well-being facts generate agent-relative reasons (for action or for attitudes) for the relevant agent. It also investigates whether prudential discourse is normative. It is proposed that prudential discourse is normative by arguing that prudential judgements are normative judgements. The case for this is presented by analogy with moral discourse by showing that the features of moral judgements that metaethicists appeal to when articulating, explaining, and justifying the claim that moral judgements are normative are also possessed by prudential judgements. Various objections to the analogy are also considered.

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Section: Objection 2: Humeanism About Reasonsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Objection 1: All Reasons Are Agent Neutralmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Taking Prudence Seriously

Fletcher¹

2019

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14

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“…Following Worsnip (2018), Fletcher (2021) conceives of prudential reasons as reasons that are distinctively and fundamentally about the promotion of an agent's well-being. Thus, the fact that, despite popular opinion, I would have been better off to have never watched the film 1917 is a reason for me to have not watched the film.…”

Section: Prudential Reasonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Plea for Prudence

Brown

2023

Analysis

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“…37 37 Parallel debates arise with respect to the normative force of morality and well‐being. Worries about the normative force of morality manifest as views that reduce moral normativity to desires or personal well‐being—think, for example, of prudential answers to the infamous question, “Why be moral?” For discussion about the normative force of well‐being, see Worsnip (2018) and Fletcher (2019, 2021). …”

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confidence: 99%

Reasons, normativity, and value in aesthetics

King

2021

Philosophy Compass

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Discussions of aesthetic reasons and normativity are becoming increasingly popular. This piece outlines six basic questions about aesthetic reasons, normativity, and value and discusses the space of possible answers to these questions. I divide the terrain into two groups of three questions each. First are questions about the shape of aesthetic reasons: what they favour, how strong they are, and where they come from. Second are relational questions about how aesthetic reasons fit into the wider normative landscape: whether they are distinctive, what their normative status is, and how they interact with each other and with non‐aesthetic reasons. This piece aims to provide a taxonomy to clarify and organise the burgeoning literature and to make a few concrete suggestions for avenues of future research.

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Eliminating Prudential Reasons

Cited by 16 publications

References 15 publications

Taking Prudence Seriously

Taking Prudence Seriously

A Plea for Prudence

Reasons, normativity, and value in aesthetics

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