Electoral Systems and Legislators’ Constituency Effort

Abstract

In so far as legislators value re-election, electoral institutions are said to shape their strategic behavior. Yet, the empirical evidence linking legislators’ behavior to electoral institutions is weak at best. Previous studies, we argue, have either ignored or misspecified how legislators’ vulnerability to electoral defeat mediates the expected effect of electoral institutions. To test this argument, we develop and operationalize a new comparative measure of electoral vulnerability which we combine with new individual-level data on legislators’ constituency effort in 14 (mostly European) countries. Our data demonstrate that the effect of electoral institutions on constituency effort is different dependent on legislators’ electoral precariousness. In party-centered systems, district magnitude’s negative effect grows weaker among those most vulnerable. In candidate-centered systems, by contrast, district magnitude’s positive effect grows even stronger among those most vulnerable. The results suggest the need to revisit studies focusing exclusively on the impact of institutions on legislators’ constituency-oriented behavior.

When Does She Rebel? How Gender Affects Deviating Legislative Behaviour

“…Evidence for the effect of electoral systems on legislative voting is, however, mixed. In a cross-national study analysing 23 democracies, Scott Morgenstern and Stephen Swindle (2005) demonstrate that the electoral system does not have a clear impact on legislative voting behaviour (see also André et al 2014; Coman 2015; Sieberer 2006). Aiming to resolve this controversy, Ulrich Sieberer and Tamaki Ohmura (2021) take the electoral systems argument from the macro- to the micro-level, showing that electoral safety is the driving force behind electoral system effects in the German Bundestag.…”

Regions of Discord: Analyzing Subnational Influences on Chile's Foreign Trade and Investment Policies Towards the Usa During Critical Events

“…Indeed, this work contributes to the literature on the factors that cause legislators to pay more attention to their constituencies. While some works argue that legislators become more constituency-oriented for institutional (Alemán, Ramírez, andSlapin 2017, Crisp andDesposato 2004), electoral (André, Depauw, andMartin 2015, Lazarus 2009;Fukumoto and Matsuo 2015), intraparty (Dockendorff 2019, Fenno 1978, Norris 1997, biographical (Dockendorff 2019, Russo 2011) and demographic (Dockendorff 2019, Atlas, Hendershott, and Zupan 1997, Gamboa and Toro 2018 reasons, this analysis suggests that they also privilege their constituencies when there are marked economic differences between districts. These high-stakes differences may cause individuals and interest groups to pay more attention to their representatives' actions in Congress (Stein and Bickers 1994).…”

Party Control, Intraparty Competition, and the Substantive Focus of Women's Parliamentary Questions: Evidence from Belgium

“…Furthermore, we control for the parliamentary tenure of MPs (coded as the number of years since the MPs first entered a federal or regional parliament) or whether MPs hold a position as extraparliamentary party president or parliamentary party group (PPG) leader (dummy, 1 = leadership role). The electoral vulnerability of MPs is computed as a measure that theoretically ranges from 0 (safe seat) to 1 (insecure seat) and is obtained by dividing the order in which an MP was elected on a district list by the total number of seats his or her party won in that district in the previous elections (e.g., André, Depauw, and Martin 2015). 10 The basic idea behind these controls is that inexperienced or electorally insecure MPs have more incentives to showcase activity (to party selectorates or voters) compared to those with more experience, electoral security, or leadership functions who might employ instruments more selectively (Strøm 2012).…”