2020
DOI: 10.1177/1354068820953527
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Abstract: Coalition theories of presidential regimes have frequently assumed coalition formation is a mostly post-electoral phenomenon. We challenge this view by showing that pre-electoral bargaining shapes to a substantial extent minority presidents’ disposition to cooperate with the legislature by forming a majority cabinet. Examining a dataset of pre- and post-electoral coalitions from 18 Latin American countries, we find that majority coalition cabinets are more likely to occur when elected presidents form pre-elect… Show more

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Cited by 11 publications
(9 citation statements)
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References 35 publications
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“…The legislative contingent of the coalition as a whole is also unknown, which may lead to a minority coalition. However, Borges et al (2020) have shown that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form majority cabinets than any other agreement. Moreover, the bargaining of pre-electoral agreements is theoretically not limited in time, since it can begin several months or years before the election (as for the organization of common primaries or the designation of a common candidate).…”
Section: Conceptualizing the Timing Of Coalition Formation Under Presidential Regimesmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…The legislative contingent of the coalition as a whole is also unknown, which may lead to a minority coalition. However, Borges et al (2020) have shown that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form majority cabinets than any other agreement. Moreover, the bargaining of pre-electoral agreements is theoretically not limited in time, since it can begin several months or years before the election (as for the organization of common primaries or the designation of a common candidate).…”
Section: Conceptualizing the Timing Of Coalition Formation Under Presidential Regimesmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Las características institucionales del sistema político pueden incentivar a los actores a formar coaliciones de distinto tipo y en diferentes momentos. Por ejemplo, en un sistema presidencialista, partidos que consideren que su potencial de votos no será suficiente para ganar la elección, se verán incentivados a formar coaliciones pre-electorales con otros candidatos y partidos y así compartir recursos y coordinar estrategias de campaña (Borges, Turgeon, y Albala 2020). 1 En las últimas décadas, la política argentina y en particular las estrategias electorales han estado marcadas por dinámicas de tipo coalicional (Clerici 2015;Cruz 2019).…”
Section: El Frente De Todos Según La Literatura Sobre Coalicionesunclassified
“…While parties and presidential candidates often build pre-electoral alliances that carry over into post-electoral coalition cabinets, the allies of the elected president have relatively little control over the terms of the postelectoral cooperation (e.g. Borges et al 2020;Freudenreich 2016;Kellam 2017). By contrast, alliance formation under the version of semi-parliamentarism sketched in Table 8.2 would give the prime minister's pre-electoral allies representation in the confidence committee and thus a powerful position after the election.…”
Section: Allowing For Pre-electoral Coalitionsmentioning
confidence: 99%