Electoral change and its impact on the party system in Italy

Bardi, Luciano

doi:10.1080/01402380701500256

Cited by 86 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…The electorally timed release of arrears has also been observed elsewhere, e.g., in Russia (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 2004). 7 The influence of the central party organizations on their peripheral structures is a long-standing feature of the relationship between centre and regions (Tarrow 1977), and it has been reinforced by the electoral systems used in national elections from 1994 on, which have centralized the selection of national candidates (Bardi 2007;Giannetti and Laver 2001;Hopkin 2009). 8 For Trentino-Alto Adige, each of its two autonomous provinces have separately been entered into the database.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Clientelistic budget cycles: evidence from health policy in the Italian regions

Stolfi¹,

Hallerberg²

2015

Journal of European Public Policy

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Clientelistic budget cycles: evidence from health policy in the Italian regions

Stolfi¹,

Hallerberg²

2015

Journal of European Public Policy

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“…Yet, there are importance differences between Italy and Japan. is more fragmented than in Japan (see Column IV), the practice of pre-electoral alliances in Italy has allowed political parties to form two camps for electoral purposes since the electoral reform in 1993 (Bardi 2007;Katz 2005;Bartolini et al 2004). …”

Section: Majoritarian Politics and "Election-oriented" Policy Shiftsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Politics of defamilialization: A comparison of Italy, Japan, Korea and Spain

Estévez-Abe

Naldini

2016

Journal of European Social Policy

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Abstract:This paper investigates the politics of "familialisation of care" in four familialist countries-Italy, Japan, Korea and Spain-during the past fifteen years. By "familialisation of care," we refer to those public policies, which aim at reducing the care responsibility of the family-both for the young and the old. We build upon the existing literature on new social risks by highlighting the role of those macro-political institutions that have not received sufficient attention such as electoral systems. We consider different institutional contexts that give rise to different types of policy processes, which we distinguish as "problem-oriented" versus "electionoriented" policy shifts. We attribute the cross-national variations among our four countries to the different institutional contexts instead of their differences in terms of the partisan government composition or cultural/attitudinal orientations.

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“…The political history of the 1990s in Italy is marked by profound change in terms of the parties themselves and the overall party system. Dramatic electoral reforms passed in 1993 (Bull and Pasquino, 2007) produced a completely different set of winners, a new configuration of political parties in a new political system, and a new way of constructing political coalitions after elections in 1994 (Bardi, 2007). The DC -and indeed all of the parties in the previous party system -had completely collapsed and new political parties took their place (Morlino, 1996).…”

Section: Italymentioning

confidence: 99%

The formation of cognitive locks in single party dominant regimes

Forestiere

Allen

2011

International Political Science Review

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Cognitive locks' are ideational path dependencies in policy making (Blyth, 2001). This article argues that one source of cognitive locks is the presence of single party dominant regimes. Single party dominant regimes exist where a single party has managed to control the process of executive formation for an unusually long period of time. Because of their long tenure in executive office, dominant parties are often in positions to implement strong cognitive locks on their political societies. Not all cognitive locks are the same, however. Rather, how the dominant party behaved, either as a 'distributional coalition' or as an 'encompassing organization' (Olson, 1982) and how it subsequently incorporated 'voice' (Hirschman, 1970) to accommodate multiple interests, strongly influence the scope of the dominant party's cognitive lock. These observations are utilized in two brief case illustrations derived from well-known cases of single party dominance.

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Electoral change and its impact on the party system in Italy

Cited by 86 publications

References 6 publications

Clientelistic budget cycles: evidence from health policy in the Italian regions

Clientelistic budget cycles: evidence from health policy in the Italian regions

Politics of defamilialization: A comparison of Italy, Japan, Korea and Spain

The formation of cognitive locks in single party dominant regimes

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