The marginal political costs of different types of taxes and government spending, as well as voter preferences over different fiscal variables, are examined using two different specifications for political costone based on the probability of incumbent defeat and the other based on the incumbent's percentage of the vote. Models associated with these two specifications, in which voting behaviour depends on disaggregated taxes and government expenditures, are estimated using data from Canadian provincial elections. The empirical results, which indicate that different types of taxes and expenditures have quite different marginal political costs, have important implications for models that incorporate voter preferences. This paper has benefited from the comments of Constance E. Smith, seminar participants at the University of Alberta and the Annual Meetings of the Canadian Economics Association in Calgary, June 1994, as well as two anonymous referees. We are grateful to Brad Reid and Donna White for assistance with data colleciion and Denise Young for help with the abstract. Canadlan Juurnal uf Economtc\ Revue canad~enne d'Econumique, xxx. Nu. I