Economic returns to social power: Merchants' finance and interlinkage in the grain markets of Bangladesh

Crow, Ben; Murshid, K.A.S.

doi:10.1016/0305-750x(94)90145-7

Cited by 31 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…the small trader who buys from the grower, the itinerant merchant who purchases the paddy in the village market, the paddy commission agent or wholesaler who assemblies the paddy, and the mill which processes the paddy into rice.' 10 Further, access to credit is vitally important in this chain (McGregor, 1989;Crow and Murshid, 1994). Our data are not rich enough to distinguish between prices at each level of this wholesale marketing chain.…”

Section: Testing For the Law Of One Price 481mentioning

confidence: 93%

Testing for the law of one price: rice market integration in Bangladesh

Dawson

Dey

2002

J of Intl Development

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Recent studies of spatial market integration have adopted error correction models to test for its existence and for market dominance. An integrated empirical framework is proposed here which tests for long-run spatial market integration between price pairs using a dynamic vector autoregressive model and cointegration. Hypotheses tests of market integration, perfect market integration, and causality are conducted sequentially. The approach is illustrated using monthly prices from rice markets in Bangladesh since trade liberalisation in 1992. Results show that rice markets are perfectly integrated and that Dhaka dominates near markets but is dominated by more distant markets. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Section: Testing For the Law Of One Price 481mentioning

confidence: 93%

Testing for the law of one price: rice market integration in Bangladesh

Dawson

Dey

2002

J of Intl Development

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“…When they do, median cash prices are 13% higher than credit prices. We therefore find little evidence that advances to farmers hide 'exploitative' practices by traders (Crow and Murshid 1994). Credit duration is a bit longer than with traders --14 days on average with a median of 7 days-but it is certainly shorter than the agricultural season.…”

Section: Payment Methods and Trade Creditmentioning

confidence: 65%

Agricultural Markets in Benin and Malawi: The Operation and Performance of Traders

Fafchamps

2001

Policy Research Working Papers

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Based on original trader surveys, this paper examines how agricultural traders operate in two subSaharan African countries, Benin and Malawi. Results indicate that the largest transaction costs are search and transport. Search methods rely principally on personal vis its by the trader himself or herself, which raises search costs. Since enterprises are very small, transport represents a large share of marketing costs. Brand recognition, grading, and quality certification are non-existent. Brokers and agents are not organized in commodity exchanges. Quantities are not pooled for transport and storage so as to achieve returns to scale. Inter-seasonal and inter-regional arbitrage is outside the purview of most traders, who prefer to operate in a small territory on a day-by-day basis. The information presented here provides some important insights as to how agricultural trade can be improved. Policy interventions can be conceived in four main areas: (i) increasing traders' asset base; (ii) reducing transaction risk; (iii) promoting more sophisticated business practices; and, (iv) reducing physical marketing costs.

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“…It is argued here that what superficially appears to be a case of varying degrees of exploitation within each exchange relationship, especially so for pickers at the hands of panni dealers, is really but a reflection of deep-rooted institutional oppression and dependence foisted on a particular group, in this case both pickers and panni dealers, by society. To clarify further, so-called exploitation of pickers by their dealers is best captured by modifying Crow and Murshid's (1994) working definition of power so: the economically more powerful party, 'bb' (of caste B), made the economically weaker party, 'b' (also of caste B), an offer which 'b' could not refuse because the choice sets faced by B are constrained by institutionalised discrimination on a broader societal level which leave no feasible alternative.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Crow and Murshid (1994) draw on Harsanyi (1962) for a working definition of the power of one trader over another, 'A made B an offer that B could not refuse' (Crow andMurshid, 1994: 1012). However, as market power derives from an unequal distribution of resources (assets, institutions, information) that are collectively rather than individually constituted, they propose a modified working definition of power: 'a (of social class A) made b (of B) an offer which b could not refuse because the options of B constrained by the options of A leave no feasible alternative' (Crow andMurshid, 1994: 1012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interlinked contracts and social power: Patronage and exploitation in India's waste recovery market

Gill

2007

The Journal of Development Studies

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Interlinked contracts have been examined almost exclusively in the context of the rural sphere. This article describes the nature of exchange regimes between two sets of primary collectors of recyclable waste, that is, waste pickers and itinerant buyers, and their dealers, in the city of Delhi. Far from the casualised labour transaction commonly described for the unorganised urban sector, the findings portray a picture of personalised and surprisingly long-term exchange between the parties. While a new institutional economics approach might explain the underlying motivation and consequent general form of the implicit contracts, it cannot explain the differential nature of each. It is suggested that in order to do that a political economy approach must be taken. This would understand interlinked transactions as being embedded within and consequently influenced by the particular social context, in this case of an inequitable and impermeable caste hierarchy amongst those that engage in waste work.

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Economic returns to social power: Merchants' finance and interlinkage in the grain markets of Bangladesh

Cited by 31 publications

References 13 publications

Testing for the law of one price: rice market integration in Bangladesh

Testing for the law of one price: rice market integration in Bangladesh

Agricultural Markets in Benin and Malawi: The Operation and Performance of Traders

Interlinked contracts and social power: Patronage and exploitation in India's waste recovery market

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