Dynamic psychological games

Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Dufwenberg, Martin

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.004

Cited by 395 publications

(177 citation statements)

References 64 publications

(96 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

162

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Hence, context frames can induce different choices among players, who choose according to their FOBs. For example, conditionally cooperative players prefer cooperation to defection in prisoner's dilemmas but only if they believe that their partner will cooperate (see Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2009;Cubitt, Drouvelis, & Gächter, 2011;Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001). Framing a prisoner's dilemma as "the Community Game" could thus increase a conditionally cooperative player's FOB in cooperation if she believes that it also raises the FOB of her partner, assuming that his choice is similarly FOB-dependent.…”

Section: Coordination Device Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Another frame, another game? Explaining framing effects in economic games

Gerlach¹,

Jaeger²

2016

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Small changes in the framing of games (i.e., the way in which the game situation is described to participants) can have large effects on players' choices. For example, referring to a prisoner's dilemma game as the "Community Game" as opposed to the "Wall Street Game" can double the cooperation rate (Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004). Framing effects are an empirically well-studied phenomenon. However, a coherent theoretical explanation of the observed effects is still lacking. We distinguish between two types of framings - valence framing and context framing - and provide an overview of three general classes of theories that may account for the observed changes in behaviour.

show abstract

Section: Coordination Device Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Another frame, another game? Explaining framing effects in economic games

Gerlach¹,

Jaeger²

2016

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…When individual i is willing to incur a cost in order to punish another individual j for choosing an action that inflicts harm on i relative to some reference point, we say that he exhibits "negative reciprocity" (an example is responders' tendency to reject "insultingly low" offers in the Ultimatum Game). 6 Fehr and Gächter (2000) survey the literature, and point out that negative reciprocity emerges as a stronger motive than its counterpart, "positive reciprocity" (the propensity to reward friendly behavior): "Whereas the positive effects of fair treatment on behavior are usually small, the negative impact of unfair behavior is often large" (Fehr et al (2009, p. 366) Formula (2) captures these phenomena in reduced form: workers perceive a wage offer below their reference point as a loss, which triggers a negative-reciprocity response.…”

Section: Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reference Dependence and Labor Market Fluctuations

Eliaz

Spiegler

2014

NBER Macroeconomics Annual

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We incorporate reference-dependent worker behavior into a search-matching model of the labor market, in which firms have all the bargaining power and productivity follows a log-linear AR(1) process. Motivated by Akerlof (1982) and Bewley (1999), we assume that existing workers' output falls stochastically from its normal level when their wage falls below a "reference point", which (following Kőszegi and Rabin (2006)) is equal to their lagged-expected wage. We formulate the model game-theoretically and show that it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that exhibits the following properties: existing workers experience downward wage rigidity, as well as destruction of output following negative shocks due to layoffs or loss of morale; newly hired workers earn relatively flexible wages, but not as much as in the benchmark without reference dependence; market tightness is more volatile than under this benchmark. We relate these findings to the debate over the "Shimer puzzle" (Shimer (2005)).

show abstract

“…5 6 The donor's type is private information. The observer's prior is that the donor is generous with probability p, for some real number p 2 (0; 1), and is miserly with probability 1 p. 7 The donor can donate any amount x 2 [0; 1). If he donates x then he receives an intrinsic payo¤ of g(x) if generous and m(x) if miserly, where g and m are real valued functions.…”

Section: A Signalling Model Of Donationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Note however, that our results would generalise to …nitely many more types. 7 Note the primary reason for using 'generous' and 'miserly' is the convenience of the letters g and m, alternative interpretations are thus easily accommodated. 8 Technically, we are not going to need some of these assumptions, e.g.…”

Section: A Signalling Model Of Donationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Note that since our donor cares about the receiver's beliefs, our model is a psychological game (Battigali and Dufwenberg 2009). With regard to signalling games, it is relatively standard with one important exception: When 9 Note that because the donor is one of only two types it is without loss of generality that we assume there is a unique threshold with category reporting.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

How category reporting can improve fundraising

Cartwright

Patel

2013

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Many fundraisers report donations using categories such as more than £ 1000, more than £ 10,000 etc. One naturally wonders how we should categorise donations and whether category reporting can raise more funds than simple uncategorised reporting. To shed light on these questions, we employ a signalling game framework in which both the donor's donation and his bene…ts of being in a higher category are determined endogenously. Our analysis suggests that categorised reporting can always improve fundraising. Indeed, we show that both a high and a low category threshold can increase donations. Categorised reporting, especially with a high threshold, can though also lead to the existence of a low donation equilibrium. Fundraisers may then have to choose between: a safer low threshold and a potentially more lucrative high threshold where they would also have to try to coordinate individuals on the desirable equilibrium.

show abstract

Dynamic psychological games

Cited by 395 publications

References 64 publications

Another frame, another game? Explaining framing effects in economic games

Another frame, another game? Explaining framing effects in economic games

Reference Dependence and Labor Market Fluctuations

How category reporting can improve fundraising

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About