Dumping and Subsidy Cases at the ITC: Voting Discretion and Commissioner Attributes

Abstract

In antidumping and countervailing duty cases, why do commissioners of the International Trade Commission vote as they do? Commissioners are presented with the same petitions, listen to the same oral arguments, have access to the same economic data, and operate under the same trade laws. Yet there is variability in voting behavior. Political economy models have left an incomplete understanding of ITC voting and recent literature suggests there may be attributes of the commissioners that explain their voting behavior. This study of votes on antidumping and countervailing duty cases between 1992 and 1999 looks at five such attributes: political party, party of the appointing president, prior employment on Capitol Hill, profession as lawyers, and prior employment in business and labor organizations. Applying a statistical analysis reveals that, of these five variables, only prior affiliation with business and labor organizations and political party appear related to ITC Commissioners'voting patterns.

Trade Effects of Anti-dumping in India: Who Benefits?

“…This is because anti-dumping is an expensive form of protection. There is a plethora of studies which indicate that AD outcomes are influenced by political pressures (Brook 2005), ambiguities in the legal provisions and their implementation (Raafat & Salehizadeh 2002), and rent-seeking capabilities of industries and firms (see, for instance, Feaver & Wilson 2004 for a comprehensive analysis; and Aggarwal 2007a for a review of the literature). It is, therefore, expected that large and dominant producers in more concentrated, better-organized industries should be more effective in influencing politicians and decisionmakers to grant protection.…”