2002
DOI: 10.1017/s026021050300007x
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Dressing up domination as ‘cooperation’: the case of Israeli-Palestinian water relations

Abstract: This article analyses the extent to which Israeli-Palestinian water relations were affected and transformed by the Oslo process. Focusing in turn on the management of water systems and supplies, the monitoring of water resources and the development of new supplies, the article suggests that many of the seeming and much-lauded achievements of the Oslo process were more cosmetic than real. Comparing Israeli-Palestinian water relations before and since the onset of the Oslo process, the article contends that the … Show more

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Cited by 84 publications
(42 citation statements)
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References 3 publications
(5 reference statements)
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“…One way that Israel maintains the consolidated control it has over the water resources is through the use of institutional structures set up in the 1995 Oslo II accords -the Israeli -Palestinian Joint Water Committee (JWC). Selby has described the Joint Water Committee as a tool more of domination than of cooperation (Selby, 2003b), one that ensures "joint mismanagement" of shared resources (Selby, 2005). An inequitable distribution of the water resources and an unresolved water conflict with its neighbours is the result.…”
Section: Some Outcomes Of Hydro-hegemonymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One way that Israel maintains the consolidated control it has over the water resources is through the use of institutional structures set up in the 1995 Oslo II accords -the Israeli -Palestinian Joint Water Committee (JWC). Selby has described the Joint Water Committee as a tool more of domination than of cooperation (Selby, 2003b), one that ensures "joint mismanagement" of shared resources (Selby, 2005). An inequitable distribution of the water resources and an unresolved water conflict with its neighbours is the result.…”
Section: Some Outcomes Of Hydro-hegemonymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Negotiating the scale of management under conditions of power asymmetry can also explain why some international scholars have criticized the spatial institutional components of the IsraeliPalestinian agreements, including setting the JWC jurisdiction over the West Bank rather than the entire Mountain Aquifer. This spatial choice was called "dressing up domination as co-operation" (Selby 2003) or as an "imposed-order regime" that benefits the Israeli side at the expense of Palestinian water (Zeitoun 2007).…”
Section: Discussion: Lessons From the Israeli Casementioning
confidence: 99%
“…While the presence of a bilateral agreement may look like sign of good cooperation, often agreements are not implemented or are the cause of conflictive relations (Selby 2003;Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2008). In the Yarmouk case, the presence of agreements with Jordan coexisted with the presence of conflictive relations over the allocation of the waters of the Yarmouk.…”
Section: Shaping Contexts In the Yarmouk Basinmentioning
confidence: 99%