Does the Buddhist doctrine of non-self denies the concept of subject?

Abstract

The object of this research is the Buddhist doctrine of non-self; while the subject is the content of this doctrine and its evolution with the course of time. Special attention is given to demonstration of the fact that initially the Anatta doctrine did not imply the denial of existence of the subject (self) as such. The author examines such aspects of the topic as the doctrine of non-self in the early Buddhism (Pāli Canon) and the problem of interpretation of the phenomenon of self in modern Buddhism, including by such cultural and philosophical figures as Ngawang Lobsang Tenzin Gyatso (14th Dalai Lama). The novelty of the conducted research consists in carrying out the first in Russia comprehensive study of Buddhist doctrine of non-self and outlining a new perspective on the problem. The author’s special contribution is lies in translations of the passages from Sutta dedicated to Anatmavada, which allowed formulating the fundamentally new conclusions. The following conclusions were made: 1) throughout history, Anatmavada underwent a difficult path from solely soteriological teaching that did not imply denial of self or subject to the open denial of subject in Buddhism of later period (the author sees recent interpretation of Anatmavada as incorrect); 2) two concepts of Anatta in early Buddhism can be determined: more common Anatmavada-2 and more “marginal” Anatmavada-1, which tends to denial of Anatta; 3) Anatmavada has evolved over the course of history from Anatmavada-2 to more nominalistic interpretations observed in the Buddhism of later period in form of the denial of self as such; 4) early Buddhism is not interested in ontological discourse on the existence of self; 5) Skandha in early Buddhism should be viewed from soteriological perspective – as a subject for meditation on the emergence, existence and elimination of certain moments of experience.