Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The results suggest that leftist governments did not decrease short term nominal interest rates at all. In contrast, short term nominal interest rates were higher under leftist governments. A potential reason for this finding might be that leftist governments have sought to make a market-oriented policy shift by delegating monetary policy to conservative central bankers. Terms of use: Documents inJEL Classification: E52, E58, D72, C23

Creative accounting and electoral motives: Evidence from OECD countries

“…15 On political business cycle and partisan effects in monetary policy, see, e.g., Dreher and Vaubel (2009) and Belke and Potrafke (2012). 16 Eurostat data on stock-flow adjustments caused by valuation effects are available for only 23 of the countries in my sample and only for years after 1995.…”

Price Sentiment of Croatian Consumers: The Upward Bias of Collective Memories

“…Both approaches are often criticized for their too-restrictive assumptions (Nardo, 2003;Brachinger, 2008), and therefore will not be applied here. 5 A similar tendency is observable in the political business cycle literature: conservative governments (associated with the large holders of nominal claims) tend to be more inflation averse, whereas the social-liberal governments place more weight on fighting unemployment to protect the interests of the economically endangered segments of society (Belke & Potrafke, 2012). 6 The sample is divided in three groups with respect to work: employed, unemployed and not in the labor force.…”

Monetary dialogue 2009–2014: Looking backward, looking forward

“…This view can also be supported from policy cycle perspective (Belke and Potrafke, 2012 In fact, the ECB must become even more transparent, as soon as the bank is tasked the surveillance of the large majority of the EU banking system. Indeed, a bank restructuring may imply additional burden for the public budget and, in addition, the ECB will have to take up law making powers once it is tasked to issue regulations regarding banking oversight.…”