Disagreement Lost and Found

Finlay, Stephen

doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805076.003.0008

Cited by 36 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 30 publications

(12 reference statements)

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“…But it's also possible for a contextualist to draw on relativist resources to explain disagreement. It's helpful to see the recent suggestion by Stephen Finlay (2016) (This proposition is false, because p is in fact compatible with the propositions in m T .) Finlay suggests that ordinary speakers are willing to assert (14), because they think that there is some proposition that Doug is disposed to assert, and that is false relative to our information.…”

Section: The Severity Of This Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shifty Contextualism About Epistemics

Perl¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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According to a highly natural, orthodox view, epistemic modals like might and must are contextually variable, allowing us to express different propositions in different contexts of utterance. This view (contextualism about epistemic modals) is the orthodox one because the only other ways of making sense of how epistemic expressions are sensitive to information (views like relativism, expressivism, and dynamicism) carry such unorthodox commitments. Yet it has faced more than its share of challenges. In this paper, I will argue that two important challenges for contextualism about epistemic modals receive the very same solution: one problem about disagreement, and one problem about the reasonableness of our epistemic beliefs. The first of these challenges is very familiar, and the second less so, but equally important.

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Section: The Severity Of This Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shifty Contextualism About Epistemics

Perl¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…On the other hand, if the case is treated as a doxastic disagreement, then two notions of disagreement are employed. This is neither a problem in itself nor unheard of (e.g., Finlay [2017] is explicit about this strategy in connection to predicates of personal taste), but it leads to a less economical view about disagreement. In comparison to both the relativist and the contextualist who appeals to disagreement in attitude, each postulating only one type of disagreement, postulating two types is theoretically costlier.…”

Section: Disagreement As Clash Of Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Wyatt's Absolutist Account of Faultless Disagreement in Matters of Personal Taste

Hîncu

Zeman

2021

Theoria

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In this critical paper, we engage with a recent absolutist proposal to account for faultless disagreementthat of Jeremy Wyatt. We first introduce the phenomenon to be explained and briefly present Wyatt's account. The bulk of the paper is dedicated to spelling out objections to various aspects of the view, which are related to his adherence to semantic minimalism, the interpretation of the empirical data he relies on, and his construal of both faultlessness and disagreement. We end with a comparison of the proposal with other views on the market from the point of view of theoretical economy.

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“…18 Cf. Björnsson & Finlay (2010); Plunkett & Sundell (2013);Finlay (2014Finlay ( : ch. 8, 2017; Silk (2017); Khoo & Knobe (2018); Bolinger (ms.).…”

Section: (B) Parochial Contextualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…23 E.g. Harman (1975Harman ( , 1996; Dreier (1990); Brogaard (2008); Björnsson & Finlay (2010); Khoo & Knobe (2018); also Finlay (2014), modulo his relativization to ends rather than standards. Silk (2017) is officially neutral between parochialism and aspirationalism (2017: 207-8, 236), but many aspects of his presentation and positive view reveal parochialist assumptions (ibid.…”

Section: (C) Aspirational Contextualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If that's so, perhaps what's distinctive of normative usages of 'ought' is that the speaker in some sense endorses or accepts as 32 Cf. the usage in, e.g., Finlay (2014). 33 Indeed, Knobe & Szabó (2013) plausibly argue that there are "impure" usages of 'ought' where there's no sharp line between a set of standards and a set of expectations, with the worlds being ordered by this standards-expectations hybrid.…”

Section: (C) An Expressivist Insightmentioning

confidence: 99%

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‘Ought’-contextualism beyond the parochial

Worsnip

2018

Philos Stud

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Forthcoming in Philosophical StudiesPlease cite published version where possible One of the major developments in the metaethical literature of the last decade or so is the increasing popularity of, and attention to, a view about the meaning of 'ought' known as "contextualism". 1 The basic feature of a view that makes it contextualist is that it claims that the semantic content of 'ought' varies depending on the value of one or more parameters that are determined by the context in which it is uttered. On its own, this is a rather weak and unspecific claim. It says nothing about how the semantic content of 'ought' varies from context to context, or what the relevant parameters are, or how they are determined. As I'll argue in a moment, construed in this generic and unspecific way, contextualism -"generic contextualism", let's call it -should not really be all that controversial.Yet -and this has been the source of significant confusion within discussion of contextualism -the term 'contextualism' is often associated in the metaethical with a much more specific kind of contextualist view. This more specific view is characterized by two claims. The first claim concerns what one of the relevant parameters is: it is a parameter for a set of normative standards, or similar. The second, and particularly distinctive, claim concerns how the value of the standards parameter is determined by context: the relevant standards in any context of utterance will be those that the speaker, or others in the speaker's environment, actually subscribe to. Thus, simplifying, 'A ought to Ф' means something like 'by standards S, A ought to Ф', where S are the standards of the speaker, or others in the speaker's environment. And so this utterance will be true so long as the standards of the speaker, or others in the speaker's environment, require Ф-ing.Call this view "parochial contextualism", since it makes the semantic content of 'ought'-claims dependent on the local or parochial standards of the speaker (or those in her environment). Unlike generic contextualism, parochial contextualism should be, and is, controversial among metaethicists. According to parochial contextualism, a normative utterance can be made true simply by a speaker (or others in her environment) subscribing to a set of standards according to which it is true. Thus, parochial contextualism makes the truth of normative utterances radically mind-dependent. As I'll suggest later, while parochial contextualism does not, strictly speaking, entail metaethical anti-realism, it sits unnaturally with realism. Parochial contextualism is naturally thought of as a way of combining anti-realism about the metaphysics of the normative with a cognitivist, non-error-theoretic view of normative thought and talk, according to which moral utterances express beliefs that can be straightforwardly (but mind-dependently) true or false. No wonder parochial contextualism -and For helpful discussions and/or comments related to this paper, I'm grateful to , and three anonymous referees. I'm espec...

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Disagreement Lost and Found

Cited by 36 publications

References 30 publications

Shifty Contextualism About Epistemics

Shifty Contextualism About Epistemics

On Wyatt's Absolutist Account of Faultless Disagreement in Matters of Personal Taste

‘Ought’-contextualism beyond the parochial

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