2008
DOI: 10.5465/amj.2008.32626007
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Director Interlocks and Spillover Effects of Reputational Penalties From Financial Reporting Fraud

Abstract: I examined the spillover of reputational penalties between firms in the context of financial reporting fraud. Drawing from signaling and attribution theories, I used financial event study methodology and found significant reputational penalties in 45 (18.4%) out of 244 firms with director interlocks to 30 firms accused of financial reporting fraud in the United States. Furthermore, logistic regression analysis suggested that firms thus associated with accused firms were more likely to experience significant re… Show more

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Cited by 235 publications
(214 citation statements)
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References 94 publications
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“…In this manner, networks create a shared social environment (Weick & Roberts, 1993) where organizations convey the value of certain practices to others in the network (Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007) regardless of whether or not the practices enhance or diminish social or environmental welfare (Kang, 2008;Pfarrer, Smith, Bartol, Khanin, & Zhang, 2008).…”
Section: Structural Elements: Board Networkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this manner, networks create a shared social environment (Weick & Roberts, 1993) where organizations convey the value of certain practices to others in the network (Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007) regardless of whether or not the practices enhance or diminish social or environmental welfare (Kang, 2008;Pfarrer, Smith, Bartol, Khanin, & Zhang, 2008).…”
Section: Structural Elements: Board Networkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Organizations that are new or in the process of being founded encounter difficulties because they lack a performance track record or reputation for delivering quality products (Freeman et al 1983). While incumbents find their abilities to obtain financial resources to be dependent on their reputation (Milgrom and Roberts 1986;Fombrun and Shanley 1990;Stuart et al 1999;Higgins and Gulati 2006;Kang 2008), new organizations, especially in the start-up phase, are restricted in their access to financial resources due to this lack of reputation. Earlier studies, however, show that the reputations of core members of an organization-not necessarily new-such as top management teams, have an impact on the reputation of the organization as a whole (Higgins and Gulati 2006;Cohen and Dean 2005).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While incumbents find their ability to obtain financial resources to be dependent on their reputation, new ventures are restricted in their access to financial resources due to a lack of reputation, (Milgrom and Roberts 1986;Fombrun and Shanley 1990;Stuart et al 1999;Higgins and Gulati 2006;Kang 2008). However, new organizations do have members, and the composition of early membership can contribute to the organization's corporate reputation.…”
Section: Reputations and Investment In New Venturesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Normally, investors rely on data and official papers provided by the companies to make investment decisions (Kang, 2008;Sanders & Boivie, 2004). By adopting a diverse perspective linking board diversity to company performance, some studies have examined the market reactions to the appointment of women to the boards.…”
Section: The Appointment Of Women On Boards and Market Reactionsmentioning
confidence: 99%