Directed Reflective Equilibrium: Thought Experiments and How to Use Them

Abstract

In this paper we develop a new methodology for normative theorising, which we call Directed Reflective Equilibrium. Directed Reflective Equilibrium is based on a taxonomy that distinguishes between a number of different functions of hypothetical cases, including two dimensions that we call representation and elicitation. Like its predecessor, Directed Reflective Equilibrium accepts that neither intuitions nor basic principles are immune to revision and that our commitments on various levels of philosophical enquiry should be brought into equilibrium. However, it also offers guidance about how different types of cases ought to be sequenced to achieve this result. We argue that this ‘directional’ approach improves, in various ways, upon the non-directional approach of traditional Reflective Equilibrium.

How to use imaginary cases in normative theory

“…To show that to be so requires considering projection in a little more detail. Slavny et al (2021) suggest that imaginary cases can be utilized in a manner similar to huband-spoke accounts of models in science. The imaginary case is the hub, and the spokes are the cases to which it is applied.…”

“…It is not always clear with fictional stories what the structural similarities are. Slavny et al (2021) view Peter Singer's Drowning Child case as an example of a hub of the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it": "[I]f I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing" (Singer 1972, 230).…”