Die Deutsche Verwaltungselite der Regierungen Brandt bis Merkel II. Herkunft, Zusammensetzung und Politisierung der Führungskräfte in den Bundesministerien

Abstract

Dieser Beitrag präsentiert die Befunde der Elitestudie Politisch-Administrative Elite 2013 (PAE 2013) über Zusammensetzung und Politisierung der bundesdeutschen Verwaltungseliten. Diese vierte nationale Replikation der Comparative Elite Studies zum Ende der 17. Legislaturperiode bringt überraschende Entwicklungen ans Licht: Hinsichtlich der Zusammensetzung des Personals schreitet zwar die Feminisierung auch auf den Leitungsebenen fort und eine Berufsvererbung kann nicht mehr festgestellt werden, allerdings erlebt die Juristendominanz mit erstmals seit Jahrzehnten steigenden Werten ein Wiedererstarken. Der Grad an formaler Politisierung überrascht: Trotz des Verbleibs der CDU/CSU an der Macht findet ein umfassender Personalaustausch statt. Diese teils im Widerspruch zu etablierten Trends und Theorien stehenden Entwicklungen zeigen, dass das Feld der administrativen Elitenforschung auch zukünftig besondere Aufmerksamkeit verdient.

Politics and Administration in Germany

“…They not only develop draft laws and draft policies but also play a prominent role in intra-governmental coordination as well as negotiation and coordination with other levels of government and external actors, such as interest groups (see also Mayntz and Scharpf 1975). A replication of CES in the second half of the 1980s (Mayntz and Derlien 1989) as well as more recent studies (Ebinger et al 2018;Ebinger et al 2019) confirm these findings and underline that most senior officials in federal ministries not only appreciate the political side of their job but also anticipate political considerations when fulfilling their tasks. Thus, the main focus of the federal level on policymaking is reflected in a high degree of functional politicisation among civil servants in federal ministries.…”

“…Thus, the main focus of the federal level on policymaking is reflected in a high degree of functional politicisation among civil servants in federal ministries. Functional politicisation is higher in ministries than in federal agencies, and higher for top positions than for lower hierarchical ranks (Ebinger et al 2018).…”

“…Promotion to the top positions in federal ministries depends both on professional competence and on party political attachment and loyalty (Bach and Veit 2018). Political civil servants are mostly, but not necessarily, members of the same political party as the minister (Fleischer 2016) and most of them are replaced after a change in government (Ebinger et al 2018). The share of party members and civil servants with clear party-political loyalties among top civil servants is high, even among 'nonpolitical' heads of sub-directorates and divisions (Bach and Veit 2018;Ebinger et al 2018).…”

Independence despite Political Appointment ? The Curious Case of the Austrian Ombudsman Board

“…Th ere is a large amount of literature on the politicization of the (elite) administration and the judiciary (Christiansen et al 2016;Ebinger et al 2018;Eymeri-Douzans 2003;Hustedt and Salomonsen 2014). While this literature cannot be immediately applied to the situation of ombudspersons, there are certain analogies we can draw on, especially regarding (top) public offi cials.…”

“…Th e domination of legal education can generally be observed among senior offi cials in Austria (Liegl and Müller 1999). A high degree of formal education -and a dominance of the legal education -is similarly prevalent among Germany's executive politicians and administrative elite (Ebinger et al 2018; Jann and Veit 2010).…”