“…mal channels through which politics exerts influence on monetary policy despite the de jure statutory arrangements in place to safeguard central bank independence. This is especially the case at a time when independence looks particularly vulnerable because of populist politics, rising public debt, and dwindling public support for central banks, at least in advanced economies (Goodhart and Lastra, 2018;Rodrik, 2018;Jones and Matthijs, 2019;Masciandaro, 2019;Peia and Romelli, 2019). In fact, it has been argued that the rise of populism is likely to be negatively correlated with the consensus in favor of central bank independence (see Buiter, 2014;de Haan and Eijffinger, 2017;Agur, 2018;Goodhart and Lastra, 2018;Masciandaro and Passarelli, 2019, among others).…”