2019
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3492533
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Did Bank Lending Stifle Innovation in Europe During the Great Recession?

Abstract: Using the 2008-09 Global financial crisis and the 2012 Euro area sovereign debt crisis as natural experiments, we investigate the effects of contractions in credit supply on R&D spending in a large sample of European firms. Our identification strategy exploits differences in financial constraints across firms, as well as the cross-industry variation in dependence on external finance, to identify a causal effect of bank credit supply on firm investment in innovation. We show that firms that are more likely fina… Show more

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“…mal channels through which politics exerts influence on monetary policy despite the de jure statutory arrangements in place to safeguard central bank independence. This is especially the case at a time when independence looks particularly vulnerable because of populist politics, rising public debt, and dwindling public support for central banks, at least in advanced economies (Goodhart and Lastra, 2018;Rodrik, 2018;Jones and Matthijs, 2019;Masciandaro, 2019;Peia and Romelli, 2019). In fact, it has been argued that the rise of populism is likely to be negatively correlated with the consensus in favor of central bank independence (see Buiter, 2014;de Haan and Eijffinger, 2017;Agur, 2018;Goodhart and Lastra, 2018;Masciandaro and Passarelli, 2019, among others).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…mal channels through which politics exerts influence on monetary policy despite the de jure statutory arrangements in place to safeguard central bank independence. This is especially the case at a time when independence looks particularly vulnerable because of populist politics, rising public debt, and dwindling public support for central banks, at least in advanced economies (Goodhart and Lastra, 2018;Rodrik, 2018;Jones and Matthijs, 2019;Masciandaro, 2019;Peia and Romelli, 2019). In fact, it has been argued that the rise of populism is likely to be negatively correlated with the consensus in favor of central bank independence (see Buiter, 2014;de Haan and Eijffinger, 2017;Agur, 2018;Goodhart and Lastra, 2018;Masciandaro and Passarelli, 2019, among others).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%