2006
DOI: 10.1017/cbo9780511491689
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Deterring America

Abstract: Faced with America's military superiority, many countries are turning to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a means to deter United States intervention. However, the events of September 11 awakened America to a degree of vulnerability it had never experienced before, making it increasingly unwilling to tolerate such weapons in the hands of unstable and unpredictable regimes. Through theoretical, historical, and prescriptive lenses, this book explores the modern security dilemma created by the twin fears of… Show more

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Cited by 38 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Some observers have inferred from this that these states will cross all redlines and hence are not adequately subject to deterrence. 122 Yet none of these states has ever launched a nuclear attack nor, to our knowledge, ever supplied WMD to terrorists. In short, deterring weapons acquisition is harder than deterring use, so that difficulties preventing the former might not imply anything about preventing the latter.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Some observers have inferred from this that these states will cross all redlines and hence are not adequately subject to deterrence. 122 Yet none of these states has ever launched a nuclear attack nor, to our knowledge, ever supplied WMD to terrorists. In short, deterring weapons acquisition is harder than deterring use, so that difficulties preventing the former might not imply anything about preventing the latter.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To Smith, this puts the burden of proof on deterrence advocates to prove the strategy will not fail. 31 Gerard Alexander is even more explicit in judging the trade-off: 'While false positives in these matters (unnecessary wars) are costly, type 2 errors (false negatives) have become much more costly with the development of unconventional weapons.' 32 Knopf challenges this assessment.…”
Section: The F Ourth Wave In Deterrence Researchmentioning
confidence: 99%