Design and coordination for multi-channel recycling of oligopoly under the carbon tax mechanism

Zhan, Xueli; Ma, Junhai; Li, Yaping; Zhu, Liqing

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.03.142

Cited by 26 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Under the dynamic carbon trading price, there is a stable strategy. In the multi-channel recycling supply chain of duopoly manufacturers, Zhan et al (2019) explored the impact of carbon tax on manufacturers' recycling and carbon emission reduction strategies, further constructed a multi cycle dynamic game model, and analyzed the complex characteristics of bifurcation, chaos and sensitivity. Bao et al (2020) considered the government subsidy behavior and consumers' low-carbon preference factors, studied the short-term and long-term game behavior of duopoly carmakers, and compared the optimal strategies under three game models (cooperation, noncooperation and cost sharing).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research On Equilibrium Strategy and Emergency Management of Three Oligarch Battery Manufacturers Under Cooperative Promotion and Low-Carbon Policy

Zhang

Zhu

Zhao

et al. 2021

Preprint

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As a crucial technology of solving energy shortage and environment contamination, battery technology is increasingly paid attention to by people. Among various batteries, lithium battery and Zinc-nickel battery are the most competitive and promising ones, especially the Zinc-nickel battery, which will induce shock to current battery industry chain. Meanwhile, the drastic change of exterior environment, such as 5G, Sharing Economy, low-carbon policy, trade protectionism and covid-19 has brought huge challenge to the management of battery industry chain. In this context, this paper set up a battery supply chain, including two zinc-nickel battery manufacturers and a lithium battery manufacturer. Against the background of cooperative promotion of big data and low-carbon policy, this paper constructs a cooperative game model under non cooperative game and demand disturbance respectively, analysing and discussing equilibrium strategy of supply chain. The results show that the price set by the manufacturer increases with the improvement of its technical level when consumers are more sensitive to technical level; with the increase of the Carbon Emission Technology Renewal Coefficient, the optimal price of all the three manufacturers will drop; when the market promotion rate is in the middle range, the price of zinc-nickel battery will be higher than that of lithium battery. In the demand disturbance model, the supply chain determines different optimal prices according to the different ranges of demand disturbance.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research On Equilibrium Strategy and Emergency Management of Three Oligarch Battery Manufacturers Under Cooperative Promotion and Low-Carbon Policy

Zhang

Zhu

Zhao

et al. 2021

Preprint

Self Cite

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“…Hwarng and Yuan [23] further examined the chaos theory and its related methodology applied in the supply chain under demand uncertainty. e chaos theory has been applied in the analysis of the multichannel supply chain [24][25][26][27] and closed-loop supply chain [28,29]. Facing the negative impacts of chaos on the supply chain, Göksu et al [30] studied the synchronization and control of a chaotic supply chain system.…”

Section: 2mentioning

confidence: 99%

Profitability vs. Stability: The Choice of Trading Strategies in a Capacity Sharing Supply Chain

Han

Yao

2021

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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Supported by a third-party capacity sharing platform, manufacturers can share capacities with others to match the rapidly changing demand. Both the capacity requestor and the capacity provider can choose to seek or wait for matches, forming different trading strategies (capacity- and demand-driven strategies). Based on the game and chaos theories, this paper analyzes the preference of the capacity provider, the capacity requestor, and the capacity platform operator on different trading strategies from the aspects of profitability and stability. It finds that the platform operator values stability much more than profitability, although the latter may reach higher optimal expected profits. The preference of each supply chain member is influenced by the production cost, potential market size, and the limited capacity of the capacity requestor. A stable system can result in higher long-run profits than a profitable system. We further propose the all-win situation for the capacity provider, capacity requestor, and platform operator.

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“…Numerical simulations demonstrated that the system with varying parameters may evolve into chaos. Zhan et al [32] built a duopoly game model of two competitive manufacturers with one manufacturer recycling used products under carbon tax policy. After solving the single-phase equilibrium solution, the model was extended to a multi-period dynamic setting.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Remanufacturing Mode Selection regarding Technology Development

Wang

2021

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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We consider a Cournot game model between an OEM (original equipment manufacturer) and an IR (independent remanufacturer). The OEM manufactures new products and decides the quality level. IR remanufactures and obtains OEM’s technology through technology licensing or joint R&D. To prevent the cannibalization of new products by remanufactured products, the OEM may be reluctant to disclose latest technology to the IR. When the IR chooses the technology licensing mechanism, it will be in a rather disadvantaged position in the competition. In contrast, joint R&D can avoid this dilemma. The two mechanisms are comparatively analyzed under static equilibrium and complex dynamics from three aspects: (1) the output of new and remanufactured products, (2) the profits of the OEM and the IR, and (3) TEI (total environmental impact) under technology licensing mechanism and joint R&D mechanism, respectively. Based on the theoretical and numerical analysis, we derive that the joint R&D mechanism can achieve a Pareto improvement over the royalty mechanism under certain conditions. The stability, bifurcation, chaos, and largest Lyapunov exponent are analyzed in the dynamic model. Numerical examples show that chaos may cause the OEM and the IR to lose profits or even be in deficit. But from the perspective of TEI, chaos can be beneficial. Interestingly, some conclusions in the static setting are reversed in the chaotic state. We propose a feedback adjustment method to eliminate chaos.

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Design and coordination for multi-channel recycling of oligopoly under the carbon tax mechanism

Cited by 26 publications

References 15 publications

Research On Equilibrium Strategy and Emergency Management of Three Oligarch Battery Manufacturers Under Cooperative Promotion and Low-Carbon Policy

Research On Equilibrium Strategy and Emergency Management of Three Oligarch Battery Manufacturers Under Cooperative Promotion and Low-Carbon Policy

Profitability vs. Stability: The Choice of Trading Strategies in a Capacity Sharing Supply Chain

Remanufacturing Mode Selection regarding Technology Development

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