2022
DOI: 10.1080/01292986.2021.1971270
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Demystifying disinformation shadow economies: fake news work models in Indonesia and the Philippines

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Cited by 24 publications
(33 citation statements)
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“…In Southeast Asia, existing studies chart the development of a disinformation industry in various countries aimed at winning elections and the ability of governments to capitalise upon disinformation to control political discourse as part of a broader phenomenon of digital authoritarianism (Masduki, 2022;Ong & Tapsell, 2022;Sinpeng & Tapsell, 2021). Drawing on research in the Philippines and Indonesia, Ong and Tapsell (2022) propose a typology of dominant disinformation "work models:" a state-sponsored model combining the repressive machinery of the state with hyper-partisan trolling; an "in-house" model where disinformation is waged by political staff with experience in dirty-campaigning in elections; an advertising and public relations model, where disinformation is outsourced to consultants, and a clickbait model driven by advertising revenue. Other research on disinformation in Indonesia has identified the government as responsible for pro-government information campaigns designed to appear independent of it (Mufti & Rasidi, 2021;Sastramidjaja et al, 2021).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In Southeast Asia, existing studies chart the development of a disinformation industry in various countries aimed at winning elections and the ability of governments to capitalise upon disinformation to control political discourse as part of a broader phenomenon of digital authoritarianism (Masduki, 2022;Ong & Tapsell, 2022;Sinpeng & Tapsell, 2021). Drawing on research in the Philippines and Indonesia, Ong and Tapsell (2022) propose a typology of dominant disinformation "work models:" a state-sponsored model combining the repressive machinery of the state with hyper-partisan trolling; an "in-house" model where disinformation is waged by political staff with experience in dirty-campaigning in elections; an advertising and public relations model, where disinformation is outsourced to consultants, and a clickbait model driven by advertising revenue. Other research on disinformation in Indonesia has identified the government as responsible for pro-government information campaigns designed to appear independent of it (Mufti & Rasidi, 2021;Sastramidjaja et al, 2021).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These elections were heavily packed with polarized information and competing smear campaigns propagated through social media platforms. Ong and Tapsell (2022) have argued that such cybertrooper activity is primarily commercially driven and only partially ideologically motivated. Outside of election campaigns, Indonesian government ministries commonly employ, officially and unofficially, influencers to promote their messaging and programs (ICW, 2020; Tapsell, 2021).…”
Section: Influencers and Their Subcultures In Indonesiamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…After the blasphemy accusations against Ahok, the Jakarta governor, in 2016 and the subsequent demonstrations that led to his arrest and imprisonment, cyber activity was flooded with divisive material put out on the internet and amplified by trolls. Anti-Ahok material circulated was, for instance, critical of his Chinese ethnicity, which denotes being a foreigner and communist; his Christian faith was touted through radical Islamist tones as an infidel (Lim, 2017;Ong & Tapsell, 2021). The other side also pushed distorted facts about Ahok's opponent; Anies accused him of being linked to several corruption incidences and made absurd accusations that he had intentions of introducing sharia law and being cheered on by Iranian Shia groups.…”
Section: Trolling/buzzingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The illegality of these devious cyber practices can be conceptualized through these domains of law. Measures put in place and suggested for cyber policy and cyber law review in Indonesia are problematic in certain instances, ironically manifest as draconian measures that risk victimizing the very populace it is protecting (Ong & Tapsell, 2021).…”
Section: The Legality Of Some Devious Cyber Practicesmentioning
confidence: 99%