Demonstrative Concepts Without Re-Identification

Chuard, Philippe

doi:10.1007/s11098-004-4509-6

Cited by 24 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Clearly, it is hard to describe examples of things we have never encountered before -any example which I can easily describe is going to amount to, or at least be very close to, something we have seen before. Chuard (2006) in a related discussion introduces the idea of alien stones appearing on a scientist's desk. The idea is to provoke our intuitions, to imagine something unfamiliar appearing.…”

Section: Seeing and Sense-makingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making

Cappuccio¹,

Froese²

2014

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This series brings together work that takes cognitive science in new directions. Hitherto, philosophical reflection on cognitive science -or, perhaps better, philosophical contribution to the interdisciplinary field that is cognitive science -has for the most part come from philosophers with a commitment to a representationalist model of the mind.However, as cognitive science continues to make advances, especially in its neuroscience and robotics aspects, there is growing discontent with the representationalism of traditional philosophical interpretations of cognition. Cognitive scientists and philosophers have turned to a variety of sources -phenomenology and dynamic systems theory foremost among them to date -to rethink cognition as the direction of the action of an embodied and affectively attuned organism embedded in its social world, a stance that sees representation as only one tool of cognition, and a derived one at that.To foster this growing interest in rethinking traditional philosophical notions of cognition -using phenomenology, dynamic systems theory, and perhaps other approaches yet to be identified -we dedicate this series to "New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science".

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Section: Seeing and Sense-makingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making

Cappuccio¹,

Froese²

2014

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“…Examples of nonconceptual content include information that is relevant to everyday ordinary actions, like driving, playing football or simply seeing, which often involve precise magnitudes and colours that we are not aware of and cannot be made aware of. However, many recent discussions, including arguments given by Heck and Chuard, have questioned whether the so-called richness argument and the fine-grainedness argument for the existence of nonconceptual content, which exploit the above mentioned intuitions, do really succeed in establishing the content view (see, Chuard, 2006;Heck, 2007). I basically agree with their complaints but I am not going to review them here.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An independent, empirical route to nonconceptual content

Chadha

2009

Consciousness and Cognition

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“…(); cf . Chuard () and Byrne (, §4). All that is needed for my purpose is that some class of perceptual experiences, such as instances of perceiving‐ as and ‐ wh , are conceptual, and their being conceptual is not due to the presence of belief or judgment with respect to the experience's content (as evidenced by cases of known illusion: I can see—visually perceive —one line as longer than another but not believe or judge it to be longer, because I know better).…”

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confidence: 99%

Practical Perception and Intelligent Action

Bengson

2016

Philosophical Issues

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Perceiving things to be a certain way may in some cases lead directly to action that is intelligent (e.g., skillful, wise, clever, astute). This phenomenon has not often been discussed, though it is of broad philosophical interest. It also raises a difficult question: how can perception produce intelligent action? After clarifying the question-which I call the question of "practical perception"-and explaining what is required for an adequate answer, I critically examine two candidate answers drawn from work on related topics: the first, inspired by Hubert Dreyfus's phenomenological analysis of absorbed coping (and of a piece with James Gibson's theory of affordances), focuses on awareness of situational features; the other, suggested by Gilbert Ryle's classic treatment of knowledge-how, focuses on possession of behavioral dispositions. I argue that neither approach is adequate. Subsequently, I develop and defend an alternative answer that emphasizes the agent's conceptual understanding.

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Demonstrative Concepts Without Re-Identification

Cited by 24 publications

References 23 publications

Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making

Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making

An independent, empirical route to nonconceptual content

Practical Perception and Intelligent Action

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