Demographic scenarios for the EU : migration, population and education

Abstract

It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking process. The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission or of IIASA. Neither the European Commission, IIASA nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission and IIASA is responsible for the use that might be made of this publication.

How will COVID-19 impact Australia's future population? A scenario approach

“…These include Australia's extreme bushfire season of 2019–2020 ( Bradstock et al, 2021 ), potentially impacting internal migration flows, and rising tensions with China which could affect international student flows in the coming years ( Foster, 2021 ). There is clear value in developing more complex scenarios incorporating a fuller range of influences, although this falls outside the scope of the current study ( Amran, 2019 ; Rees et al, 2010 ).…”

A contested foundation of European integration: The free movement of labour

“…A coincidence of political interests also supports this perception. In the EU demographic scenarios, among the net receiving Member States, Germany's population would decline without immigration from EU countries, even with high international migration (Lutz et al 2019). With a few exceptions, the CEE governments also did not raise the issues of free movement prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.…”

“…For example, Romania is expected to lose 30 per cent of its population between 2015 and 2060 in the intra-EU mobility scenario, and 'only' 14 per cent in the no intra-EU mobility scenario. In the case of Poland, the difference is smaller between the scenarios (approximately five percentage points), but it is sizeable (Lutz et al 2019). Furthermore, the forecast of the demographics-driven labour shortages in the EU suggests that the countries that are likely to experience severe supply-side constraints between 2020 and 2030 are nine CEE countries that are typically sending countries (the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, Hungary, Latvia, and the Slovak Republic) and Germany (Streher -Leitner 2019).…”

How Much Does Migration Affect Labor Supply in Europe? Methodological Insights and Contemporary Evidence from the European Union and Selected European Countries

“…In addition, the choice of countries is based on their experiences as immigrant-receiving countries (OECD 2015). Thus, Switzerland (CH, 2011(CH, -2018, the United Kingdom (the UK, 2009UK, -2018, France (FR, 2006(FR, -2013, the Netherlands (NL, 2006(NL, -2018, Germany (DE, 2012(DE, -2018, and Austria (AU, 2008(AU, -2018 are analyzed as examples of long-standing destination countries with many settled migrants, while Italy (IT, 2006(IT, -2018 and Spain (SP, 2006(SP, -2018 are considered examples of new host countries with many recent migrants. Norway (NO, 2007(NO, -2018 and Sweden (SW, 2006(SW, -2018 are analyzed as examples of countries that have recently experienced significant levels of humanitarian migration.…”

“…At the same time, migration is often seen in the academic literature as a way to attenuate an adverse demographic landscape and the prospects of a downward trend in the size of the labor force (Federico and Baglioni 2021;Kerr and Kerr 2011). In Europe, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, overall trends in international mobility have been affected by the 2008 economic recession, the 2015 refugee crisis, and EU enlargement (Lutz 2019), leading to migration's increasing importance for population change (Bagavos 2022) and labor supply trends (De la Rica, Glitz, and Ortega 2015).…”