Political decentralization is widely believed to reduce ethnic
conflict and secessionism in the world today. Yet decentralization is more
successful in reducing conflict and secessionism in some countries than in
others. In this article, I explore why this difference occurs. I
demonstrate using a statistical analysis of thirty democracies from 1985
to 2000 that decentralization may decrease ethnic conflict and
secessionism directly by bringing the government closer to the people and
increasing opportunities to participate in government, but that
decentralization increases ethnic conflict and secessionism indirectly by
encouraging the growth of regional parties. Regional parties increase
ethnic conflict and secessionism by reinforcing ethnic and regional
identities, producing legislation that favors certain groups over others,
and mobilizing groups to engage in ethnic conflict and secessionism.Earlier versions of this article were presented
at Harvard University and the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics
at Princeton University. The author would like to thank Sandra
Alfonso-Leon, James Alt, Micah Altman, Barry Friedman, Shigeo Hirano,
Simon Hug, Gary King, Rose Rozaghian, Tulia Falleti, and two anonymous
reviewers for their very helpful comments.