Democratization and Civic Capital

Abstract

We document a sharp reversal in electoral participation between the North and the South of Italy after the 1912 enfranchisement which extended voting rights from a limited élite to (almost) all adult males. When voting was restricted to the élite, electoral turnout was higher in the South but falls significantly below that in the North after the enfranchisement. Furthermore the new gap is never bridged over the following century and participation remains lower in the South despite the enrichment of democratic institutions and further extension of voting rights to the female population during the post war democratic republic. This pattern in the data is consistent with a simple model where individuals' voting in political elections is affected by private benefits and by civic duty, only elites can grab private benefits from participation in politics and civic culture differs across communities. We also find that extension of voting rights to non-elites results in a significant transfer of power to their political organizations only among populations with a high sense of civic duties. Together with the very persistent gap in participation between North and South our findings suggest that democratization -a process of concession of democratic rightscan benefit non-elites only when the latter have already a high sense of civic capital and is unlikely to be a viable avenue for inducing norms of civic behavior.Keywords: Democracy, culture, civic capital, institutions formation JEL: 2"If the democratic model of the participatory state is to develop in these new nations it will require more than the formal institutions of democracy -universal suffrage, the political party, the elective legislature. These in fact are also part of the totalitarian participation pattern, in a formal if not functional sense. A democratic form of participatory political system requires as well a political culture consistent with it."

Decentralization and growth: Do informal institutions and rule of law matter?

“…On the critical role played by trust in economic performance, see Arrow (1972) and Alesina and Giuliano (2015) for a recent survey. On the persistent character of social capital, see Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008), Guiso and Pinotti (2012) and Bisin and Verdier (2010). For a discussion about the similarities between informal institutions and social capital, see Knowles (2006).…”

Peasants, bandits, and state intervention: The consolidation of authority in the Ottoman Balkans and Southern Italy

“…The victory of the ruling classes in the suppression of the peasant revolts in Southern Italy also influenced Italy's poor economic performance (Sereni, ). As a result, the Risorgimento “remained essentially an element between the Savoy monarchy and the urban high class, whereas large segments of the peasant population were, at best sceptical about or even fiercely against, the process of unification” (Guiso & Pinotti, , p. 309).…”

The Missing Link? Trust, Cooperative Norms, and Industrial Growth in Italy

“…18 Finally, Guiso and Pinotti have also shown that social capital levels differed to a large extent across Italy's regions prior to WWI, by using a quasi-natural experiment based on the extension of franchise in 1912. 19 Although these different contributions have identified large regional disparities in social capital on the eve of the 20 th century, the hypothesis on the importance of social capital for regional divergence before the Great War remains untested, mainly because of the lack of data and measurement problems. This work aims to fill the gap, by connecting social-capital estimates at provincial level with the growth of industry across areas of the country between 1871 and 1911.…”