Deference and Ideals of Practical Agency

Abstract

This paper develops a moderate pessimist account of moral deference. I argue that while some pessimist explanations of the puzzle of moral deference have been misguided in matters of detail, they nevertheless share an important insight, namely that there is a justified moral agency ideal grounded in pro tanto reasons against moral deference. This thought is unpacked in terms of a set of values associated with the practice of morality. I conclude by suggesting that the solution to the puzzle of moral deference developed here gives us a plausible recipe for generalizing to certain cases of nonmoral deference as well.

Normative Demand for Deference in Political Solidarity

“…Kolers (2016) strikingly argues that individual conscience is such a poor guide to appropriate moral judgments that when faced with oppression one must defer to what the oppressed ask of solidaristic allies. Yet, in relation to moral knowledge -i.e., judgments about right and wrong -moral theorists have worried that abdicating one's moral decision-making to others is itself a moral failing, and that even if one were to accept the right moral judgment, acting on that judgment would amount to doing so for the wrong reasons (e.g., Knutzen, 2021). Consider again industrial action in the academy: If I generally believe that I ought to uphold norms of justice, and you (regardless of how you are situated) advise me that justice to students requires me to break the strike, it would seem to be a failure on my part not to evaluate for myself the morality of your advice.…”