Decline and Retrenchment: Peril or Promise?

Abstract

s article "Graceful Decline?" offers a clear, parsimonious theory of great power retrenchment that helps ªll a massive gap in international relations scholarship. 1 Through comparative case studies and "coarse grained" statistical analysis, MacDonald and Parent argue that the degree of a state's decline often explains the form and extent of its retrenchment. They then show that retrenchment is a surprisingly common and effective response to relative decline. MacDonald and Parent correctly point out the myopia of the "pessimistic" structuralist dogma that simply dismisses retrenchment as an impractical and dangerous strategy that only accelerates decline by signaling weakness and creating additional vulnerability (pp. 13-18). 2 Their spare neorealist model goes a long way toward repairing this deªciency. As a ªrst cut, it improves on the existing literature while facilitating progressive future research on the topic. Still, a number of theoretical and conceptual problems undermine their argument and compromise their results. Below I discuss three issues with MacDonald and Parent's theory of retrenchment. power transitions and policymakers' responsivenessMacDonald and Parent operationalize decline as an ordinal power transition in which a rising state overtakes a declining state in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) and retains this new lead for at least ªve consecutive years. They justify this focus by claiming that such transitions are particularly "dramatic" events that should force policymakers in the declining state into a thorough strategic reassessment, potentially leading to retrenchment (p. 21). These are "most likely" cases for their neorealist model, as less dramatic periods of decline may fail to generate policy shifts with similar promptness.

Retrenchment as a Screening Mechanism: Power Shifts, Strategic Withdrawal, and Credible Signals

“…Moreover, despite framing their arguments in support of retrenchment, optimists broadly agree with pessimists that retrenchment is an undesirable strategy that is adopted only as a last resort. They admit that retrenchment is a “fallback option,” implemented “reluctantly, and only after a dramatic military failure has demonstrated the impossibility of maintaining their current position by force” (Haynes , 192–93) and that “retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract” (MacDonald and Parent , 9‐10). As a result, both optimists and pessimists expect that retrenchment is a strategy that declining states will adopt from a position of weakness, after decline has progressed significantly and other options are no longer available.…”

“…As a result, both optimists and pessimists expect that retrenchment is a strategy that declining states will adopt from a position of weakness, after decline has progressed significantly and other options are no longer available. As Kyle Haynes notes, “Policymakers are extremely loath to retrench, and will do so only after decline has generated overwhelming incentives for it” (Haynes , 192; see also MacDonald and Parent , 21). This is remarkably similar to the pessimist position that if a state does retrench, it “seldom retrenches or makes concessions of its own initiative,” but rather will “retrench in response to threats or military defeat” (Gilpin , 194).…”

“…For general theoretical or historical arguments against retrenchment, see Brooks and Wohlforth (), Copeland (, 40–41, 49), Gilpin (, 192–97), Ikenberry (), Monteiro (), and Thompson (). Pessimists regarding contemporary U.S. retrenchment include Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth (), Huntington (), and Kagan ().…”

Is US grand strategy self-defeating? Deep engagement, military spending and sovereign debt

“…Even critics of MacDonald and Parent’s logic of retrenchment agree with these insolvency claims. “[P]ower transition[s] do not generate insolvency more rapidly or with greater severity than other periods in a state’s decline” (Haynes et al, 2012: 190). While questioning whether power transition causes insolvency, this statement accepts that insolvency is at issue.…”

“…In contrast, a great power that falls in the ranks from number three to number four is more likely to lack capabilities, be closer to bankruptcy…[because to live] beyond one’s means is possible temporarily, but prolonged insolvency invites a terrible reckoning. (Haynes, et al, 2012: 202)…”