DEMOCRATICINSTITUTIONS ANDREGIMESURVIVAL: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered

Abstract

We review arguments and empirical evidence found in the comparative literature that bear on the differences in the survival rates of parliamentary and presidential democracies. Most of these arguments focus on the fact that presidential democracies are based on the separation of executive and legislative powers, while parliamentary democracies are based on the fusion of these powers. From this basic distinction several implications are derived which would lead to radically different behavior and outcomes under each regime. We argue that this perspective is misguided and that we cannot deduce the functioning of the political system from the way governments are formed. There are other provisions, constitutional or otherwise, that also affect the way parliamentary and presidential democracies operate and that may counteract some of the tendencies that we would expect to observe if we were to derive the regime's performance from its basic constitutional principle.

Different Paths to Democracy in the MENA Region: A Configurational Comparative Analysis

“…. Finally, political-institutional variables related to regime types having different constitutional and institutional characters may affect democratization differently [21][22][23][24]. For instance, Levine [25] emphasizes institutionalized political parties 19 , Lijphart [20] focuses on the separation of powers through decentralization 20 and Eva Bellin asserts institutionalized militaries as important factors favoring democratization 21 .…”

“…But part of the literature focuses on separation between different phases and stages of democratization that can be categorized in three groups: democratic transition, democratic stability and democratic quality 22 . .…”

The Changing Role of Ministers in the Legislative Agenda in Brazil

“…Parliamentary and presidential systems induce different coalitional outcomes, owing to the different timing and strategy involved in bargaining under each institutional arrangement. The institutional differences between multiparty presidential systems and other systems are known to lead to different incentives to participate in government (Strom, 1990;Mainwaring, 1993;Cheibub and Limongi 2002). The nature of the mandate also plays a part as well -legislatures that are highly fragmented, ideologically diverse, and lacking a clear majority make coalition bargains more complicated.…”

“…Nonetheless, choices over which parties to include in the cabinet coalition are assumed to affect policymaking -cabinet choices reflect bargains made between the president and parties in congress. In spite of the lack of a coalition agreement, all policymaking is contingent upon standing committees, specialization, scope, and allocation rules (Cheibub and Limongi, 2002). This view offers the compelling argument that institutional forces will tend to dominate the drafting of policy.…”

The Role of Parliaments in the Budget Process

“…Rather, the results of this analysis support the argument that it is more fruitful to focus attention on the specific differences in the design of institutional aspects as well as their cumulative effect. Cheibub and Limongi make this point succinctly (Cheibub and Limongi, 2002):…”