Cyber Risk Analysis of Combined Data Attacks Against Power System State Estimation

Pan, Kaikai; Teixeira, André; Cvetković, Dragoš; Pálenský, Peter

doi:10.1109/tsg.2018.2817387

Cited by 79 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 35 publications

(59 reference statements)

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“…If the communication channel between two neighboring inverters is attacked by FDI, the local controller receives the corrupted frequency signal [7,11,[55][56][57]. FDI attack on the communication channel can be modeled by:…”

Section: Fdi Attack On Microgridmentioning

confidence: 99%

A review of cyber security risks of power systems: from static to dynamic false data attacks

2020

Prot Control Mod Power Syst

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With the rapid development of the smart grid and increasingly integrated communication networks, power grids are facing serious cyber-security problems. This paper reviews existing studies on the impact of false data injection attacks on power systems from three aspects. First, false data injection can adversely affect economic dispatch by increasing the operational cost of the power system or causing sequential overloads and even outages. Second, attackers can inject false data to the power system state estimator, and this will prevent the operators from obtaining the true operating conditions of the system. Third, false data injection attacks can degrade the distributed control of distributed generators or microgrids inducing a power imbalance between supply and demand. This paper fully covers the potential vulnerabilities of power systems to cyber-attacks to help system operators understand the system vulnerability and take effective countermeasures.

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Section: Fdi Attack On Microgridmentioning

confidence: 99%

A review of cyber security risks of power systems: from static to dynamic false data attacks

2020

Prot Control Mod Power Syst

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“…To be illustrative, one can consider a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack scenario on the communication channels between the substations and the control center. Then, the attacker is capable of interfering with the transmitted measurements using the MITM tool to block the measurements, either by attacking the routing scheme or flooding the network traffic [37]. In this article, we aim to model DoS attacks on the developed LFC mathematical model in Section 2 such that the behavior of data absence caused by DoS attacks is considered in the modeling process.…”

Section: Dos Attacks On the Ac/dc Multi-area Lfc System With Virtualmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, to be disruptive of attack impact, the (absolute) MFD value should reach 0.8 Hz, as a possible load shedding scheme could be triggered when the frequency decreases to 59.2 Hz; we refer to our previous work in [32] for a detailed discussion on the selections of b min , b max and F f . In (31), f (i) denotes the i-th FDI on the measurement that the attacker has already been able to compromise; this constraint is to make (31) feasible [37]. The last constraint in (31) is introduced to show that some protected measurements in the set P could not be attacked.…”

Section: The Test Lfc Sytem Under Fdi Attacks: Basicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Effects of Cyber Attacks on AC and High-Voltage DC Interconnected Power Systems with Emulated Inertia

et al. 2020

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The high penetration of renewable energy resources and power electronic-based components has led to a low-inertia power grid which would bring challenges to system operations. The new model of load frequency control (LFC) must be able to handle the modern scenario where controlled areas are interconnected by parallel AC/HVDC links and storage devices are added to provide virtual inertia. Notably, vulnerabilities within the communication channels for wide-area data exchange in LFC loops may make them exposed to various cyber attacks, while it still remains largely unexplored how the new LFC in the AC/HVDC interconnected system with emulated inertia would be affected under malicious intrusions. Thus, in this article, we are motivated to explore possible effects of the major types of data availability and integrity attacks—Denial of Service (DoS) and false data injection (FDI) attacks—on such a new LFC system. By using a system-theoretic approach, we explore the optimal strategies that attackers can exploit to launch DoS or FDI attacks to corrupt the system stability. Besides, a comparison study is performed to learn the impact of these two types of attacks on LFC models of power systems with or without HVDC link and emulated inertia. The simulation results on the the exemplary two-area system illustrate that both DoS and FDI attacks can cause large frequency deviations or even make the system unstable; moreover, the LFC system with AC/HVDC interconnections and emulated inertia could be more vulnerable to these two types of attacks in many adversarial scenarios.

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“…Since then vulnerability and impact analysis of stealthy attacks on power systems have been a prominent subject in the literature. A typical notion to quantify the vulnerability to stealthy attacks is directly concerned with the level of efforts required to alter specific measurements [12,27]. Without advanced diagnosis tools, tampering measurements remains undetected, causing state deviations, equipment damages or even cascading failures [18].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

From Static to Dynamic Anomaly Detection With Application to Power System Cyber Security

Pan

Pálenský

Esfahani

2020

IEEE Trans. Power Syst.

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Developing advanced diagnosis tools to detect cyber attacks is the key to security of power systems. It has been shown that multivariate data injection attacks can bypass bad data detection schemes typically built on static behavior of the systems, which misleads operators to disruptive decisions. In this article, we depart from the existing static viewpoint to develop a diagnosis filter that captures the dynamics signatures of such a multivariate intrusion. To this end, we introduce a dynamic residual generator approach formulated as robust optimization programs in order to detect a class of disruptive multivariate attacks that potentially remain stealthy in view of a static bad data detector. We investigate two possible desired features: (i) a non-zero transient and (ii) a non-zero steady-state behavior of the residual generator in the presence of an attack. In case (i), the problem is reformulated as a finite, but possibly non-convex, optimization program.We further develop a linear programming relaxation that improves the scalability, and as such practicality, of the diagnosis filter design. In case (ii), it turns out that the resulting robust program admits an exact convex reformulation, yielding a Nash equilibrium between the attacker and the residual generator. This assertion has an interesting implication: the proposed approach is not conservative in the sense that the additional knowledge of the worst-case attack does not improve the diagnosis performance. To illustrate our theoretical results, we implement the proposed diagnosis filter to detect multivariate attacks on the system measurements deployed to generate the so-called Automatic Generation Control signals in a three-area IEEE 39-bus system. P.MohajerinEsfahani}@tudelft.nl).

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Cyber Risk Analysis of Combined Data Attacks Against Power System State Estimation

Cited by 79 publications

References 35 publications

A review of cyber security risks of power systems: from static to dynamic false data attacks

A review of cyber security risks of power systems: from static to dynamic false data attacks

Effects of Cyber Attacks on AC and High-Voltage DC Interconnected Power Systems with Emulated Inertia

From Static to Dynamic Anomaly Detection With Application to Power System Cyber Security

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