Cyber‐physical system testbed for power system monitoring and wide‐area control verification

Abstract

The electric power system is intrinsically a cyber-physical system (CPS) with power flowing in the physical system and information flowing in the cyber-network. Testbeds are crucial for understanding the cyber-physical interactions and provide environments for prototyping novel applications. This study proposes a four-layer architecture for CPS testbeds with emphases on communication network emulation and networked physical components. A configurable software-defined network is employed to bridge physical components with wide-area applications for closed-loop control. In order to distribute physically coupled devices into multiple software simulations, this study proposes a data broker setup based on a distributed messaging environment to achieve low-latency data streaming. The decoupled design with data streaming allows for building testbed components as modules and running them in a distributed manner. Case studies verify the data broker setup for low-latency sensing and actuation, as well as the communication emulation setup for the desired network latency. Also illustrated is a replay attack scenario using synchrophasors in the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) 181-bus system for demonstrating the closed-loop cyber-physical simulation capability of the testbed.

A Comprehensive Review of Cybersecurity in Inverter-Based Smart Power System Amid the Boom of Renewable Energy

“…The concept of model-based defense method and data-driven defense is also mentioned and clarified in their work. Moreover, microgrid structure and control system are depicted in [11], authors of such study also give an overview of simulation testbed used specifically for microgrid cybersecurity research. In 2020, authors of [12] conducted a highly influential survey to review the modeling, simulation, and cybersecurity analysis in CPPS.…”

CPS Attacks Mitigation Approaches on Power Electronic Systems With Security Challenges for Smart Grid Applications: A Review

“…Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3063229, IEEE Access [84], [105], [139], [197] Bad command generation of automatic generation control and manipulate sampling data Transmission threats SCADA [26], [77], [78] Triggering false alarms and injecting false data, and changing the switch states…”

“…The internetfaced networks directly or indirectly connected to the smart grid because of the network misconfiguration [138]. Moreover, the ICCP protocol for data exchange between control centers has serious buffer overflow vulnerabilities [139].…”

Active and passive hybrid detection method for power CPS false data injection attacks with improved AKF and GRU‐CNN

“…With the deep penetration of the new generation of information technology in the power system [1][2][3][4], a large number of electrical equipments, data acquisition devices, and terminal computing units are interconnected through two physical networks of the power grid and the communication network. The traditional power system with physical equipment as the core has gradually evolved into a highly coupled cyber-physical systems (CPS) [5][6][7][8]. As a monitoring and control system to ensure the safe and stable operation of the power grid, the power CPS realizes the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system and the phasor measurement unit (PMU) measurement data and control instruction transmission, and energy management system (EMS) data processing, analysis and decision-making, it can be seen that the power system is more and more dependent on CPS [9][10][11][12].…”