2016
DOI: 10.1515/jso-2015-0013
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Critical Theory and Processual Social Ontology

Abstract: The purpose of this article is to bridge the gap between critical theory as understood in the Frankfurt school tradition on the one hand, and social ontology understood as a reflection on the ontological presuppositions of social sciences and social theories on the other. What is at stake is the type of social ontology that critical theory needs if it wants to tackle its main social ontological issue: that of social transformation. This paper’s claim is that what is required is neither a substantial social ont… Show more

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Cited by 40 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…Moreover, Stimmung points to a dispositional state of openness for further determination (Bestimmung), both in terms of a self-activating and a foreign-affected attunement. It thus aligns well with a relational and processual ontology (Renault 2016) that emphasizes relationality, process and interactivity over individual states and fixed and stable conditions (Slaby and von Scheve 2019).…”
Section: Epiloguesupporting
confidence: 64%
“…Moreover, Stimmung points to a dispositional state of openness for further determination (Bestimmung), both in terms of a self-activating and a foreign-affected attunement. It thus aligns well with a relational and processual ontology (Renault 2016) that emphasizes relationality, process and interactivity over individual states and fixed and stable conditions (Slaby and von Scheve 2019).…”
Section: Epiloguesupporting
confidence: 64%
“…Mead's theory of the self illustrates these themes: 1) the recognitive relation between the selves has just as much reality as the selves; 2) a self is a relation to itself, and this self-relation is connected with other relations to other selves; and 3) a self can be transformed by recognitive interactions just as he can try to transform the frames of recognition in response to problematic situations. In other words, according to Mead, the self should be conceived of neither in substantial terms (the self is not a spiritual substance), nor in static relational terms (the self is not a structure), but in dynamic relational terms, that is in processual terms (Renault 2016b): as internalization of the process of recognition, the self is a process.…”
Section: Naturalism and Recognition As A Structure Of Social Experiencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…xvii On the social-ontological implications of his naturalistic metaphysics see Dewey 1928/2008, on the socialphilosophical motivation behind his metaphysics see Särkelä 2017b. xviii Closest to something resembling a systematic processual account of the pathologies of social life probably come Renault 2016, Särkelä 2017band Testa 2017. xix Neuhouser 2016…”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 99%