Counter-Closure

Luzzi, Federico

doi:10.1080/00048400903341770

Cited by 37 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Cases have been described where a true yet unknown premise allegedly grounds deductive knowledge (Coffman 2008;Luzzi 2010). E.J.…”

Section: Knowledge From a True-yet-unknown Premisementioning

confidence: 98%

What Does Knowledge-Yielding Deduction Require of Its Premises?

Luzzi¹

2014

Episteme

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According to the principle of Knowledge Counter-Closure (KCC), knowledge-yielding single-premise deduction requires a known premise: if S believes q solely on the basis of deduction from p, and S knows q, then S must know p. Although prima facie plausible, widely accepted, and supported by seemingly compelling motivations, KCC has recently been challenged by cases where S arguably knows q solely on the basis of deduction from p, yet p is false (Warfield 2005; Fitelson 2010) or p is true but not known (Coffman 2008; Luzzi 2010). I explore a view that resolves this tension by abandoning KCC in the light of these challenges, and which acknowledges their force but also their limits. Adopting this view helps identify the epistemic constraints that operate on the premises of knowledge-yielding deduction, clarifies the epistemic role of deduction, and allows us to distil the kernel of truth in the motivations that are standardly taken to support KCC.

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“…Cases have been described where a true yet unknown premise allegedly grounds deductive knowledge (Coffman 2008;Luzzi 2010). E.J.…”

Section: Knowledge From a True-yet-unknown Premisementioning

confidence: 98%

What Does Knowledge-Yielding Deduction Require of Its Premises?

Luzzi¹

2014

Episteme

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“…The first case is similar to those provided by Federico Luzzi () as counterexamples to counter‐closure (the view that in order to gain knowledge that p by inference from q one must know q ). Indeed, if one held a view of testimony on which audiences make a sub‐personal inferences from beliefs like ‘S said that p, and S is trustworthy’ to ‘I should believe that p’, then one would be forced to reject counter closure on the basis of the cases presented in this article.…”

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confidence: 67%

Testimonial Knowledge Without Knowledge of what is Said

Peet

2015

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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This article discusses the following question: what epistemic relation must audiences bear to the content of assertions in order to gain testimonial knowledge? There is a brief discussion of why this issue is of importance, followed by two counterexamples to the most intuitive answer: that in order for an audience to gain testimonial knowledge that p they must know that the speaker has asserted p. It is then suggested that the argument generalises and can be made to work on different sets of assumptions about the conditions for knowledge, and the conditions under which a proposition is asserted.

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“…K-Counter-Closure (KCC): Necessarily, if (i) S knows that p entails q and (ii) S comes to believe q solely on the basis of competently deducing it from p, and (iii) S knows q, then S knows p (Luzzi 2010). 5 Luzzi has argued rather persuasively that we can use KFF cases to show that KCC is mistaken.…”

Section: Clayton Littlejohn King's College Londonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning from Learning from our Mistakes

Littlejohn¹

2016

Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals

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Counter-Closure

Cited by 37 publications

References 26 publications

What Does Knowledge-Yielding Deduction Require of Its Premises?

What Does Knowledge-Yielding Deduction Require of Its Premises?

Testimonial Knowledge Without Knowledge of what is Said

Learning from Learning from our Mistakes

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