COTS CPU Selection Guidelines for Safety-Critical Applications

Forsberg, Håkan; Karlsson, K.

doi:10.1109/dasc.2006.313701

Cited by 10 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Currently, it is the Certification Review Item (CRI) type of document 5 , requested by the certification authority that functions as the container for the assurance strategy of complex COTS components e.g. MPUs [19].…”

Section: Certification Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

Design assurance evaluation of microcontrollers for safety critical avionics

Schwierz

Forsberg

2017

2017 IEEE/AIAA 36th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC)

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Dealing with Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components is a daily business for avionic system manufacturers. They are necessary ingredients for hardware designs, but are not built in accordance with the avionics consensus standard DO-254 for Airborne Electronic Hardware (AEH) design. Especially for complex COTS hardware components used in safety critical AEH, like Microcontroller Units (MCUs), additional assurance activities have to be performed. All of them together shall form a convincing confident, that the hardware is safe in its intended operation environment. The focus of DO-254 is one approach called Design Assurance (DA). Its aim is to reduce design errors by adherence of prescribed process objectives for the entire design life cycle. The effort for certain COTS assurance activities could be reduced if it is possible to demonstrate, that the COTS design process is based on similar effective design process guidelines to minimize desgin errors. In the last years, semiconductor manufacturers released safety MCUs in compliance to the ISO 26262 standard, dedicated for the development of functional safe automotive systems. These products are COTS components in the sense of avionics, but they are also developed according to a process that focuses on reduction of design errors. In this paper an evaluation is performed to figure out if the ISO 26262 prescribes a similar DA approach as the DO-254, in order to reduce the COTS assurance effort for coming avionic systems.

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Section: Certification Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

Design assurance evaluation of microcontrollers for safety critical avionics

Schwierz

Forsberg

2017

2017 IEEE/AIAA 36th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC)

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“…Several other electronic devices used in safety-critical systems may have to be considered for certification. For example, Forsberg & Karlsson (2006) discuss the COTS CPU selection for safety-critical applications, and Salewski and Taylor (2007) compare fault handling in FPGAs and microcontrollers for such application. General certification criteria for databuses are discussed by Rierson and Lewis (2003), and certification issues for one specific databus, AFDX, by Kornecki (2008).…”

Section: Other Types Of Circuits and Industriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hardware certification for real-time safety-critical systems: State of the art

Kornecki

Zalewski

2010

Annual Reviews in Control

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This paper discusses issues related to the RTCA document DO-254 Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware and its consequences for hardware certification. In particular, problems related to circuits' compliance with DO-254 in avionics and other industries are considered. Extensive literature review of the subject is given, including current views on and experiences of chip manufacturers and EDA industry with qualification of hardware design tools, including formal approaches to hardware verification. Some results of the authors' own study on tool qualification are presented.

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“…In addition, for certain COTS components we used the selection guidelines in [3] and followed the derating concerns in [4].…”

Section: Complex Cots Componentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Challenges in updating military safety-critical hardware

Forsberg¹

2010

IEEE Aerosp. Electron. Syst. Mag.

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Herein, we describe challenges and suggest solutions when upgrading military safety-critical hardware where RTCAlDO-254 (I) was never applied but is required now and not only for application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), programmable logic devices (PLDs), and complex commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) but for all hardware. Several challenges relate to modification to previously developed hardware resulting from hardware or technology enhancements, or procurement dimculties.

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COTS CPU Selection Guidelines for Safety-Critical Applications

Cited by 10 publications

References 8 publications

Design assurance evaluation of microcontrollers for safety critical avionics

Design assurance evaluation of microcontrollers for safety critical avionics

Hardware certification for real-time safety-critical systems: State of the art

Challenges in updating military safety-critical hardware

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