Corruption and privatization

Bjorvatn, Kjetil; Søreide, Tina

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2005.02.001

Cited by 66 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…The works of Lui (1985), Wheeler and Mody (1992), Saha (2001), Egger and Winner (2005), Bjorvatn and Soreide (2005), Wu (2006), Tekin-Koru (2006) and Barassi and Zhou (2012) are examples of this line of study.…”

Section: (Ii) Corruption Acting As the "Helping Hand" In Fdimentioning

confidence: 99%

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Multinationals and Corruption: Business as Usual?

Tekin‐Koru

2017

Globalization

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This paper disentangles the e¤ects of corruption on entry mode decision by carrying out an empirical analysis with rich, …rm-level data on the activities of Swedish MNCs around the globe in manufacturing sectors from 1987 to 1998. A number of propositions emerge from a simple theoretical framework. The panorama of the results from the empirical part supports most of these propositions: (i). Corruption has a direct negative impact on green…eld investments and a weak positive impact on M&As. (ii). There are complex, asymmetric, secondary e¤ects of corruption on the mode of entry. (iii). International experience dampens the e¤ect of corruption on the mode of entry.(iv). The results are robust to di¤erences in measures of corruption. JEL Classi…cation: F23

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Section: (Ii) Corruption Acting As the "Helping Hand" In Fdimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, in the light of these anecdotal evidence, it may not be wrong to assume that high degrees of non-mobile skills make the MNCs more corruption tolerant. 5 In addition to the variable costs, the multinational …rm incurs …xed entry costs as well. First, there is a …xed green…eld establishment cost (F (g)).…”

Section: Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multinationals and Corruption: Business as Usual?

Tekin‐Koru

2017

Globalization

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“…At the same time, this mechanism may also trigger biases among politicians with ambitions to keep their party in position. 13 It might be obvious that a high-level, short-sighted power-hunt will have consequences at the sector level, but the specific ways in which it will affect the different sector-specific policy decisions are possibly not so clear.…”

Section: Private Agendas In Infrastructure Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The resulting delays, manipulation, or truncation of otherwise well-intended policies-which can take place 43 Auriol and Blanc (2009) explain how corruption may influence privatization and show empirically that social costs of privatization are higher in poor countries. 44 This argument is spelled out by Bjorvatn and Soreide (2005). 45 For an overview of empirical evidence on how corruption influences performance through infrastructure procurement, see Della Porta and Vannucci (1999).…”

Section: The Political Economy Of Reform For Infrastructure Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

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Dealing with politics for money and power in infrastructure

Benitez¹,

Estache²,

Søreide³

2010

Policy Research Working Papers

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Democratisation and corruption in Mongolia

Fritz

2007

Public Admin & Development

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More democratic and open systems of government are generally assumed to contain corruption. Subsequent to the end of the communist system in 1990, Mongolia has established a democratic regime, and has been assessed as being relatively well governed. However, more recently, corruption has been worsening, despite the continuation of a democratic regime. This article inquires into the drivers of corruption and into the reasons for why accountability has not been more effective despite a democratic form of government. The availability of three major forms of rents—foreign aid, privatisation and natural resource extraction—is discussed as important drivers. The recent mining boom appears to have reinforced weaknesses in Mongolia's system of accountability. Underlying weaknesses include certain communist legacies, especially of intransparent government and of a ‘dependent’ judicial system, and substantially increased inequality as a result of transition. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Corruption and privatization

Cited by 66 publications

References 10 publications

Multinationals and Corruption: Business as Usual?

Multinationals and Corruption: Business as Usual?

Dealing with politics for money and power in infrastructure

Democratisation and corruption in Mongolia

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