2020
DOI: 10.3390/su12041680
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Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from the Role of the Largest Institutional Blockholders in the Korean Market

Abstract: This study investigates the monitoring effectiveness of the largest institutional blockholder in Korea, the Korean National Pension Service (KNPS), on firms’ engagement in corporate social responsibility (CSR). We use a large, unique sample from Korea, where the financial market is primarily characterized by chaebols. We show that lagged KNPS blockholdings do not significantly influence investee firms’ concurrent CSR indexes. This result indicates that even the largest institutional blockholder in Korea does n… Show more

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Cited by 13 publications
(17 citation statements)
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References 66 publications
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“…Thus, H2 is supported. Our results contradict those of Barnea and Dam (2010); Scholtens (2012); and Choi et al (2020) who did not find significant empirical evidence to relate the power of institutional investors with CSR. However, our findings are in line with the results reported by several previous studies (Soliman et al , 2013; Choi et al , 2020; Kim et al , 2018; Oh et al , 2011; Aguila et al , 2006; Elgergeni et al , 2018; Zaid et al , 2020; Chabachib et al , 2020; Chen et al , 2019) which support the positive relationship between institutional holdings and CSR engagement.…”
Section: Resultscontrasting
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Thus, H2 is supported. Our results contradict those of Barnea and Dam (2010); Scholtens (2012); and Choi et al (2020) who did not find significant empirical evidence to relate the power of institutional investors with CSR. However, our findings are in line with the results reported by several previous studies (Soliman et al , 2013; Choi et al , 2020; Kim et al , 2018; Oh et al , 2011; Aguila et al , 2006; Elgergeni et al , 2018; Zaid et al , 2020; Chabachib et al , 2020; Chen et al , 2019) which support the positive relationship between institutional holdings and CSR engagement.…”
Section: Resultscontrasting
confidence: 99%
“…Our results contradict those of Barnea and Dam (2010); Scholtens (2012); and Choi et al (2020) who did not find significant empirical evidence to relate the power of institutional investors with CSR. However, our findings are in line with the results reported by several previous studies (Soliman et al , 2013; Choi et al , 2020; Kim et al , 2018; Oh et al , 2011; Aguila et al , 2006; Elgergeni et al , 2018; Zaid et al , 2020; Chabachib et al , 2020; Chen et al , 2019) which support the positive relationship between institutional holdings and CSR engagement. They suggested that given the growing evidence of positive links between the long-term health of firms and their social behavior, institutional investors have an incentive to take the social responsibility of companies into account as they look for long-term cash flows.…”
Section: Resultscontrasting
confidence: 99%
“…These examples include the growth of the Indian stock market [60], successful financing of clean energy infrastructure, entrepreneurial development, poverty reduction [56] increasing undertaking of corporate social [62], and improving firm performance [75]. There is also other evidence suggesting the positive correlation between institutional investors and social development, such as improvement of corporate governance quality [63], achieving sustainable development goals [64] and mitigating climate risks [76].…”
Section: Moderation: Role Of Government In Open Approachmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, the organizational structures and management mechanisms of privatized state-owned enterprises are yet to deviate from a centralized system because privatized state-owned enterprises have long been subsidized by the government. This situation results in poor management of state-owned enterprises [71] and in managers' opportunistic behavior through earnings management.…”
Section: Hypothesis Setting On the State-owned Stake And Earnings Manmentioning
confidence: 99%