Cooperation in social dilemmas, trust and reciprocity

Chaudhuri, Ananish; Sopher, Barry; Strand, Paul S.

doi:10.1016/s0167-4870(02)00065-x

Cited by 58 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…However, they will cooperate across affiliations on issues that are significant to them. Such preferences support the ambition theory, which argues that legislators will cooperate with others whom they trust only if the potential gains are greater than the potential losses (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981;Maynard, 1982;Axelrod, 1984;Chaudburi, Sopher, & Strand, 2002). In addition, MKs will cooperate when they believe it will help them realize their ambition to be re-selected to run for office, re-elected or obtain a higher position (Schlesinger, 1966;Rohde, 1979;Herrick & Moore, 1993;Francis & Lawrence, 1996;Victor, 2005;Treul, 2009 The study's unique contribution is the creation of a cooperation scale that can help us understand and analyze more deeply how MKs behave as rational actors and realize their ambitions.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 72%

Legislators' Patterns of Cooperation

Akirav¹

2017

IJSSS

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This study attempts to identify the patterns of cooperation between legislators. We argue that if legislators decide to cooperate, they prefer to do so first with their colleagues who share similar affiliations and then across affiliations. In order to examine this hypothesis, we devised a unique cooperation scale and tested it using a sample of the private member bills that were initiated in the 18 th Knesset (Israel's parliament) between 2009 and 2013. We then looked at each bill with regard to its initiators and co-sponsors to see if they were members of the same party, members of the opposition or coalition, or members of a minority group. Based on the quantitative analysis, we found that of all of the factors, only being a minority was significant. Based on the qualitative analysis, we determined that intra-party cooperation does exist. In three parties -Hadash, Meretz and Israel Beitenu --legislators tended to cooperate with each other. Finally, with regard to inter-party cooperation, Jewish and Arab MKs tended to cooperate, and Russian Jewish legislators tended to cooperate regardless of party affiliation. Our study is innovative in its creation of a cooperation scale that can be used in other legislatures and that is based on measures of co-sponsorship instead of analyses of dyadic or social networks used in previous studies.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 72%

Legislators' Patterns of Cooperation

Akirav¹

2017

IJSSS

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“…MKs do cooperate across affiliations on issues that are significant to them. Such preferences support the rational choice theory, which argues that legislators will cooperate with others whom they trust only if the potential gains are greater than the potential losses (Arrow 1963;Chaudburi et al 2002). In addition, MKs will cooperate when they believe it will help them realize their ambition to be re-selected to run for office, re-elected or obtain a higher position (Schlesinger 1966;Treul 2009).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 80%

“…Rational choice theory suggests that individuals, as rational actors, trust others only if the potential gains are greater than the potential losses (Axelrod 1984;Chaudburi, Sopher, & Strand, 2002).…”

Section: Findings and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Candidate Selection Methods, Cooperation and Legislative Effectiveness

Akirav¹

2018

RES

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This study investigates whether differences in candidate selection methods and/or the changes in the Israeli political system affect cooperation between parliament members and whether such cooperation explains legislative effectiveness. To examine these issues, we discuss different types of cooperative strategies using a scale we devised that defines three options for cooperation: 1) uncooperative, 2) cooperation within the party and 3) cooperation between parties. Then, we categorize the various methods that Israeli political parties have used to select their candidates since the establishment of the state, creating four categories of a variable we call the effect of the primaries. Additionally, we consider differences in four periods of changes in the Israeli party system. Finally, we assess the results of cooperation in light of our dependent variable, legislative effectiveness, using data from 1949 to 2015. Our findings indicate that the majority of bills passed without cooperation, but when cooperative strategies were used, they usually involved inter-party rather than intra-party support. Furthermore, the adoption of primaries reduced the probability of passing bills. In addition, when one party was dominant, 68% of the representatives initiated legislation alone, while during the multi-polar fragmented period 41.9% cooperated with legislators from other parties.

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“…In fact trust and trustworthiness are fundamentally different constructs. See Chaudhuri, Sopher and Strand (2002) for further elaboration of this point. What has been interpreted as trusting behavior in prior studies (such as Berg, Dickhaut andMcCabe, 1995 or Gneezy et al 2000) has two distinct components.…”

Section: Discussion Of Our Resultsmentioning

confidence: 96%

Trust and Trustworthiness in a Sequential Bargaining Game

et al. 2003

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We use a two-person extensive form bargaining game to examine individuals' trusting and reciprocal behavior and how those relate to their scores on a trust survey. In keeping with prior research, we find that the "self-interested" outcome is rejected by a majority of individuals. People who score high on the trust survey are both trusting and are also trustworthy, in that they reciprocate others' trust. But, people with low trust scores often exhibit trust but are not trustworthy. These "inconsistent trusters" seem to be interested in exploiting the trust and trustworthiness of others in increasing their own payoff. JEL Classification: C72, C91PsycINFO classification : 2343, 3020

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Cooperation in social dilemmas, trust and reciprocity

Cited by 58 publications

References 17 publications

Legislators' Patterns of Cooperation

Legislators' Patterns of Cooperation

Candidate Selection Methods, Cooperation and Legislative Effectiveness

Trust and Trustworthiness in a Sequential Bargaining Game

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