Contextualism and Counter-Closure

Abstract

I argue that DeRose's attributor contextualism cannot straightforwardly preserve the widespread view that, when a subject believes q solely on the basis of competent deduction from p, knowledge of q requires knowledge of p. I present a novel challenge to the compatibility of this widespread view with DeRose's contextualism, then argue that the tension can be resolved in only one of two ways: if DeRose rejects the widespread view or if DeRose accepts the existence of a range of contextualism‐specific Gettier‐style cases.

Interest‐relative Invariantism and Knowledge From Ignorance

“…Several theorists assume the view without substantial argument (see Nozick, 1981 and Stanley, 2005). For the beginnings of a more thorough examination of this view, see Luzzi, 2010 and forthcoming.…”