Content-based security for the web

Afanasyev, Alexander; Halderman, J. Alex; Ruoti, Scott; Seamons, Kent E.; Yu, Yang; Zappala, Daniel; Zhang, Lixia

doi:10.1145/3011883.3011890

Cited by 9 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 38 publications

(36 reference statements)

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“…Our work highlights significant UI vulnerabilities in ShadowCrypt. Even though ShadowCrypt has not witnessed widespread deployment, we believe it is critical to understand the security of such mechanisms, which could influence the design of ongoing research systems [7,13,17,19,[28][29][30]36] and future technologies. Our work demonstrates that it is important for any system that aims to secure browser-based I/O (even beyond ShadowCrypt) to explicitly consider UI attacks in its threat model.…”

Section: Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cracking ShadowCrypt: Exploring the Limitations of Secure I/O Systems in Internet Browsers

Freyberger

Akhawe³

et al. 2018

Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies

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An important line of privacy research is investigating the design of systems for secure input and output (I/O) within Internet browsers. These systems would allow for users' information to be encrypted and decrypted by the browser, and the specific web applications will only have access to the users' information in encrypted form. The state-of-the-art approach for a secure I/O system within Internet browsers is a system called ShadowCrypt created by UC Berkeley researchers [23]. This paper will explore the limitations of ShadowCrypt in order to provide a foundation for the general principles that must be followed when designing a secure I/O system within Internet browsers. First, we developed a comprehensive UI attack that cannot be mitigated with popular UI defenses, and tested the efficacy of the attack through a user study administered on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Only 1 of the 59 participants who were under attack successfully noticed the UI attack, which validates the stealthiness of the attack. Second, we present multiple attack vectors against Shadow-Crypt that do not rely upon UI deception. These attack vectors expose the privacy weaknesses of Shadow DOM -the key browser primitive leveraged by ShadowCrypt. Finally, we present a sketch of potential countermeasures that can enable the design of future secure I/O systems within Internet browsers.

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Section: Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“….attachShadow({mode: 'open'}); 3 root.innerHTML = "<shadow></shadow>"; 4 shadow = root.querySelector("shadow"); 5 shadowCryptNodes = shadow.getDistributedNodes(); 6 plaintext = shadowCryptNodes [1].querySelector('.delegate') 7 .value;…”

Section: Shadow Dom Futurementioning

confidence: 99%

Cracking ShadowCrypt: Exploring the Limitations of Secure I/O Systems in Internet Browsers

Freyberger

Akhawe³

et al. 2018

Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies

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“…However, designing mechanisms that are efficient, scalable, and usable in order to meet the security requirements of integrity, authenticity, confidentiality and privacy are very much open problems that a few researchers have started to research on. [7,52,59]. A issue in meeting these requirements is to establish trust in the keys utilized for enforce the security mechanisms.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A more serious issue is that there is no provision for key revocation and reflecting key revocation in trust schemas. Afanasyev et al [7] [8] proposed a DNS like name service for NDN to identify the need to look up names. While the proposed system has features similar to DNSSEC [9] and to security extensions of DNS, they show that their design differs from the DNS design mainly due to how NDN operates and NDN caching mechanisms.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Securing Named Data Networks

Bertino

Nabeel

2018

Proceedings of the 23nd ACM on Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies

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Despite decades of research on the Internet security, we constantly hear about mega data breaches and malware infections affecting hundreds of millions of hosts. The key reason is that the current threat model of the Internet relies on two assumptions that no longer hold true: (1) Web servers, hosting the content, are secure, (2) each Internet connection starts from the original content provider and terminates at the content consumer. Internet security is today merely patched on top of the TCP/IP protocol stack. In order to achieve comprehensive security for the Internet, we believe that a clean-slate approach must be adopted where a content based security model is employed. Named Data Networking (NDN) is a step in this direction which is envisioned to be the next generation Internet architecture based on a content centric communication model. NDN is currently being designed with security as a key requirement, and thus to support content integrity, authenticity, confidentiality and privacy. However, in order to meet such a requirement, one needs to overcome several challenges, especially in either large operational environments or resource constrained networks. In this paper, we explore the security challenges in achieving comprehensive content security in NDN and propose a research agenda to address some of the challenges.

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“…However, NDN suffers from new security issues such as interest flooding, cache poisoning, access control, and data authenticity, to name a few [ 11 ]. Existing solutions in the literature consider traditional security approaches adopted in the vanilla NDN for fixed or wired networks [ 12 , 13 ]. In the current solutions, the content is signed by the producer and then by the authority that issued the certificate to the producer.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Trusted Lightweight Communication Strategy for Flying Named Data Networking

Barka

Kerrache

Hussain

et al. 2018

Sensors

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Flying Ad hoc Network (FANET) is a new resource-constrained breed and instantiation of Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) employing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) as communicating nodes. These latter follow a predefined path called ’mission’ to provide a wide range of applications/services. Without loss of generality, the services and applications offered by the FANET are based on data/content delivery in various forms such as, but not limited to, pictures, video, status, warnings, and so on. Therefore, a content-centric communication mechanism such as Information Centric Networking (ICN) is essential for FANET. ICN addresses the problems of classical TCP/IP-based Internet. To this end, Content-centric networking (CCN), and Named Data Networking (NDN) are two of the most famous and widely-adapted implementations of ICN due to their intrinsic security mechanism and Interest/Data-based communication. To ensure data security, a signature on the contents is appended to each response/data packet in transit. However, trusted communication is of paramount importance and currently lacks in NDN-driven communication. To fill the gaps, in this paper, we propose a novel trust-aware Monitor-based communication architecture for Flying Named Data Networking (FNDN). We first select the monitors based on their trust and stability, which then become responsible for the interest packets dissemination to avoid broadcast storm problem. Once the interest reaches data producer, the data comes back to the requester through the shortest and most trusted path (which is also the same path through which the interest packet arrived at the producer). Simultaneously, the intermediate UAVs choose whether to check the data authenticity or not, following their subjective belief on its producer’s behavior and thus-forth reducing the computation complexity and delay. Simulation results show that our proposal can sustain the vanilla NDN security levels exceeding the 80% dishonesty detection ratio while reducing the generated end-to-end delay to less than 1 s in the worst case and reducing the average consumed energy by more than two times.

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Content-based security for the web

Cited by 9 publications

References 38 publications

Cracking ShadowCrypt: Exploring the Limitations of Secure I/O Systems in Internet Browsers

Cracking ShadowCrypt: Exploring the Limitations of Secure I/O Systems in Internet Browsers

Securing Named Data Networks

A Trusted Lightweight Communication Strategy for Flying Named Data Networking

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