Choice Architecture in Democracies 2016
DOI: 10.5771/9783845263939-161
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Anne van Aaken
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Cited by 3 publications
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“…On the other hand, the examination of whether the applied tool will meet the proportionality criterion in the strictest sense comes down to a balance between the assessed values. When applying these criteria, it is necessary to examine the relationship between the usefulness of the applied legal measure for the general good of a given Member State and the limitations experienced by treaty freedoms [39,40]. The application and evaluation of tools, such as nudges and boosts, must be viewed through the prism of Article 52, Section 1 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which enables the assessment of their admissibility from a legal perspective.…”
Section: The Proportionality Principlementioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the other hand, the examination of whether the applied tool will meet the proportionality criterion in the strictest sense comes down to a balance between the assessed values. When applying these criteria, it is necessary to examine the relationship between the usefulness of the applied legal measure for the general good of a given Member State and the limitations experienced by treaty freedoms [39,40]. The application and evaluation of tools, such as nudges and boosts, must be viewed through the prism of Article 52, Section 1 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which enables the assessment of their admissibility from a legal perspective.…”
Section: The Proportionality Principlementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The second approach accepts the soundness of Crawford's point that crippling compensation should not be addressed at the level of general secondary rules, and explores seriously the tools for settling the matter on a case-by-case basis. 232 In normative terms, corrective justice is insufficient but no general alternative is proposed, deferring instead to the choice of specialist fields to strike their own balance between corrective justice, deterrence, loss allocation, and other purposes 233 in light of peculiarities of their subject-matter and institutional structure. 234 At the level of primary rules, examples could range from tweaks of particular rules, like relaxation of promptness or valuation standards for lawful expropriation by reference to the effects on the State, 235 to recalibrating scope and content of fields of law so as to prevent the characterisation as wrongful of conduct likely to give rise to crippling compensation.…”
Section: Three Futures For Crippling Compensationmentioning
confidence: 99%