2019
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-25510-7_11
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Constant-Round Group Key Exchange from the Ring-LWE Assumption

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Cited by 19 publications
(40 citation statements)
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“…However, no security proof was provided for the group version of their protocol. Recently, in Apon et al (2019), a constant-round protocol for group key exchange is proposed and proven secure in a passive scenario. Using a post-quantum signature scheme this construction can be made secure in the presence of active adversaries, by means of a well known compiler from Katz and Yung (see Katz and Yung, 2007).…”
Section: Related Work Two-party Constructionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…However, no security proof was provided for the group version of their protocol. Recently, in Apon et al (2019), a constant-round protocol for group key exchange is proposed and proven secure in a passive scenario. Using a post-quantum signature scheme this construction can be made secure in the presence of active adversaries, by means of a well known compiler from Katz and Yung (see Katz and Yung, 2007).…”
Section: Related Work Two-party Constructionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Table 1 Performance of our protocol compared to recent post-quantum solutions. Here, ADGK refers to the protocol in Apon et al (2019) and ADGK † is an authenticated version of ADGK, obtained by applying the Katz-Yung compiler. PSS refers to the solution in Persichetti et al (2019).…”
Section: Protocol Specificationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This results commonly in protocols with a substantial number of signatures being computed, transmitted, and verified: In the Katz-Yung compiler [ 1 ], for each message sent in the original protocol, a signature has to be computed and transmitted (and verified). For instance, Apon et al [ 2 ] propose the application of this compiler for their unauthenticated group key establishment solution. The compiler made by Bresson et al, [ 3 ] requires a signature for each message in the original protocol, plus one more for each protocol participant (and according signature verifications).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the Katz-Yung compiler [ 1 ], for each message sent in the original protocol, a signature has to be computed and transmitted (and verified). For instance, Apon et al [ 2 ] propose the application of this compiler for their unauthenticated group key establishment solution.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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