Congressional Voting on Labor Issues: The Role of PACS

Abstract

This study measures the impact of labor and corporate political action committee (PAC) contributions on the voting of members of the House of Representatives on labor issues during 1979–80. It also analyzes the allocation of labor PAC contributions among House candidates. PAC contributions were found to have a significant direct effect on roll-call voting, even controlling for the Representative's political party and characteristics of the constituency. Since PAC money also affects roll-call voting indirectly (by influencing which party wins elections), the overall impact of PAC money on Congressional voting is probably substantial. The author also finds that labor PACs have focused more on influencing the outcome of elections than on currying favor with powerful members of the House who are likely to be re-elected anyway.

Political strategies used by the US public accounting profession during auditor liability reform: The case of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995

“…16-17). Some studies have found a significant, positive relationship (Frendreis and Waterman, 1985;Saltzman, 1987;Wilhite and Theilmann, 1987) while other studies found no effect (Chappell, 1981;Grenzke, 1989b;Welch, 1982). Conflicting findings are explained by the fact that the money-vote relationship is complicated (Snyder, 1992, p. 17).…”

Wielding the Stick Instead of the Carrot: Labor PAC Punishment of Pro-NAFTA Democrats

“…In considering this phenomenon, researchers have identified two different strategies that PACs pursue when contributing to candidates (Conway 1991). First, some PACs follow an access strategy which involves targeting funds to those candidates who have leadership positions or committee jurisdiction over legislation crucial to the group (Herndon 1982;Gopoian 1984Gopoian , 1985Wright 1985;Maitland 1985;Denzau and Munger 1986;Grier and Munger 1986Masters and Zardkoohi 1986;Langbein 1986Langbein , 1993Saltzman 1987;Langbein and Lotwis 1990;Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990;Hall and Wayman 1990;Endersby and Munger 1992;Hurd and Sohl 1992). The second major strategy PACs follow is to target funds to those candidates who agree with them ideologically in order to get them elected.…”

Explanations of protectionism in international trade votes

“…5 Third, different regions of the country are affected differently by a trade policy, and senators recognize that the policy will lead to more or less business and employment in their state (Blake and Waiters, 1987). Winners and losers from trade policy are unevenly distributed so that constituent pressures vary by region (Saltzman, 1987). 6…”