Conditionals and the hierarchy of causal queries.

Abstract

Recent studies indicate that indicative conditionals like "If people wear masks, the spread of Covid-19 will be diminished" require a probabilistic dependency between their antecedents and consequents to be acceptable (Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016). But it is easy to make the slip from this claim to the thesis that indicative conditionals are acceptable only if this probabilistic dependency results from a causal relation between antecedent and consequent.According to Pearl ( 2009), understanding a causal relation involves multiple, hierarchically organized conceptual dimensions: prediction, intervention, and counterfactual dependence. In a series of experiments, we test the hypothesis that these conceptual dimensions are differentially encoded in indicative and counterfactual conditionals. If this hypothesis holds, then there are limits as to how much of a causal relation is captured by indicative conditionals alone. Our results show that the acceptance of indicative and counterfactual conditionals can become dissociated. Furthermore, it is found that the acceptance of both is needed for accepting a causal relation between two co-occurring events. The implications that these findings have for the hypothesis above, and for recent debates at the intersection of the psychology of reasoning and causal judgment, are critically discussed. Our findings are consistent with viewing indicative conditionals as answering predictive queries requiring evidential relevance (even in the absence of direct causal relations). Counterfactual conditionals in contrast target causal relevance, specifically. Finally, we discuss the implications our results have for the yet unsolved question of how reasoners succeed in constructing causal models from verbal descriptions.

What would have happened? Counterfactuals, hypotheticals and causal judgements

“…Counterfactual simulation explains causal judgements, whereas hypothetical simulation does not. This result extends recent work showing that people differentiate between indicative conditionals (level I) and counterfactual conditionals (level III), and that causal judgements align more closely with counterfactual judgements [43].…”

“…Most relevant to the question of how hypothetical and counterfactual judgements relate to causal judgements is a recent paper by Skovgaard-Olsen et al [43]. Across a series of six experiments, the authors show that people differentiate between indicative conditionals (if x happens then y happens) and counterfactual conditionals (if x had happened then y would have happened).…”

“…As discussed earlier, Skovgaard-Olsen et al [43] show that people are sensitive to the difference between inferences on level I and level III on Pearl’s [6] causal hierarchy, and that level III inferences are more closely aligned with causal judgements than level I inferences. The work presented here is a natural follow up.…”

Inference from explanation.

“…For example, research on conditional reasoning has shown that people’s assumptions about the causal structure (Bonnefond et al, 2014; Byrne, 1989; Byrne et al, 1999; Espino & Byrne, 2020) and their normative expectations about the frequency of events (Oaksford & Chater, 1994, 2003) affect what inferences people draw. Precisely what people infer from conditional statements is still very much under investigation (Barrouillet et al, 2008; Collins et al 2020; Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2013; Sebben & Ullrich, 2021; Skovgaard-Olsen et al, 2021). Given the tight relationship between conditionals and causality (e.g., Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001; Over et al, 2007), we suspect that inferences from conditional statements, just like inferences from explanations, may be illuminated by considering what role these statements play in communication (see also Evans, 2005; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Sebben & Ullrich, 2021).…”

Counterfactuals and the logic of causal selection

“…The relevant evidence comes from studies on how people reason about counterfactual conditionals (e.g. Lucas & Kemp, 2015;Sloman & Lagnado, 2005;Over et al, 2007;Rips, 2010;Rips & Edwards, 2013;Dehghani et al, 2012;Oaksford & Chater, 2007;Gerstenberg et al, 2013;Pfeifer & Tulkki, 2017;Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2020;Skovgaard-Olsen et al, 2021). Counterfactual conditionals are statements such as "if Alice had lost the game, then she would have drawn a black ball from the first box" (Lewis, 1973b;Stalnaker, 1981;Hiddleston, 2005;Lassiter, 2017;Starr, 2019).…”